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~) SUMMARY: The Government seeks cert from the affirmance 
~by CA9 of the granting of a suppression motion by the D.C. in 
~ IS~WW,two cases and the reversal by CA9 of a conviction in the other. 
~ ftGk_ 
~ Q The petition raises the two issues left open in fn. 3 of this 
~~ourt's opinion in United States v. Ortiz, 43 U.S.L.W. 5026. 
~ FACTS: The Government presented to a United States 
~~ 
(it-
District Judge in affidavit form information indicating that 
massive violations of the immigration laws were occurring at 
-2-
the INS to maintain the checkpoint and to stop cars carrying 
suspected violators in order to make routine inquiries and to 
make routine inspections. The INS did so. In each of three 
cases, the INS asked the car in question to proceed to the 
---- * ~--~----------------------------~---------secondary in ection ~rea and asked each of the occupants _.. -.... 
whether they were lawfully in the country. In each case some 
.., ~ ... "-.._ - -of the occupants responded in the negative and the drivers were 
eventually charged with unlawfully smuggling aliens. Each made 
a motion to suppress use of the information obtained by the INS 
as a result of the stops and questioning. Two of the motions 
were granted; and one denied. In the latter case the defend-
ant was convicted. He appealed in that case and the Government 
appealed in the others. The cases were consolidated and the 
lower court's decisions granting the suppression motions were 
affirmed by CA9. The criminal conviction was reversed. 
CONTENTIONS: The Government seeks cert. contending (1) 
that a stop may be made at a fixed checkpoint without the 
individualized suspicion needed on the open road, see United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 43 U.S.L.W. 5028; and (2) that the 
area warrant granted in this case distinguishes the case from 
United States v. Ortiz, supra, and Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S. 266, and renders the stop in this case valid. 
The Government says that whether or not the warrant is really 
a warrant in the strict Fourth Amendment sense, it does show 
that the difficult balancing involved was made not by law 
enforcement officials but by the judiciary. 
-3-
CA9 rejected the notion expressed in Justice Powell's 
concurring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez that area warrants could 
be used at all to detect illegal aliens; and further that the 
?robability of finding an alien at the checkpoint--as distin-
guished from an area near the border--was so small that, even 
accepting the area warrant idea, it could not validly apply 
here. The court concluded that the INS stopped less than one 
out of 1,000 cars going through the checkpoint and found illegal 
U1 aliens about one out of every five sto?S. CA9 did not 2-D 7o 
separately address the question whether a stop may be made 
a checkpoint without individualized suspicion. 
DISCUSSION: It is hard to believe that there are still 
two border search issues left after last term, but there are and 
this case presents them. The resolution of the question posed 
by the first argument advanced by the SG depends upon whether 
the Court believes that a stop on the open road can be distin-
guished from a fixed checkpoint stop once the Court has ruled, 
as it has, that a search on the open road cannot be distinguished 
from ~ search at a fixed checkpoint. The resolution of the 
question posed by the second argument turns on whether Justice 
Powell adheres to his concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez and 
whether the four dissenters in Almeida-Sanchez feel that once 
Almeida is accepted as precedent, its result cannot rationally 
be altered by an area warrant. It seems to me that the Court 
will want to resolve the issues in any event. 
-4-
There is a response. 
7/18/75 Nields Opinion attached to petn 
jp 
October 31, 1975 Conference 




MAR TINEZ-FUER TE 
Motion of Respondent 
for Appointment of Counsel 
Re sp requests that Charles M. Sevilla, Esq., Chief Trial Attorney of the 
Federal Defenders of San Diego, be appointed to represent him in this Court. 
On October 6, the Court granted cert to CA 9 to consider two border 
search is sues raised by the SG in the instant case and granted re sp leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis. In his affidavit in support of this request, Mr. Sevilla 
notes that his office was appointed to represent resp in the DC and has continued 
to represent him at all subsequent stages; his office is funded exclusively under 




.. defend e r organization for SD Calif. and approved as such by the CA 9 Judicial 
, 
( 
Coun cil; and his office represented resps in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce. 
The r e is no response. 
10/ 20 /7 5 Goltz 
P JN 
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Chris Whitman DATE: April 20, 1976 
No. 74-1560 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
No. 75-5387 Sifuentes v. United States 
This is obviously a field with which you are very 
familiar, so my suggestions can be of little help. My 
recommendation,for what its worth, is to affirm 74-1560 
and to reverse 75-5387. 
This may be contrary to your views. There are 
indications in the opinions you have written that you believe 
a stop can be made at a fixed checkpoint without reasonable 
suspicion or a warrant, and that a search at either a fixed 
checkpoint or by a roving control may be justified by either 
probable cause or an area warrant. I urge that an area warrant 
(but not probable cause or reasonable suspicion) be required 
for a stop at a fixed checkpoint. For that reason, I would 
reverse Sifuentes. I would also require that a fixed 
checkpoint - '· ·even one approved by an "area warrant" - have 
some rather immediate nexus with the border region. The San 
Clemente checkpoint is, I believe, too remote from the border 
to bear scrutiny. For that reason, I would affirm Martinez-Fuerte. 
2. 
These cases raise two questions, as the cert memo 
points out. The first question - and the only question raised 
by Sifuentes - is whether a stop-and-inquiry may be made at 
a fixed checkpoint without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, 
or a warrant of any sort. If that question is answered in 
the affirmative, both cases are disposed of. If it is answered 
in the negative, the Court must go on to decide whether the 
procedure is permissible if supported by a search warrant 
based on the characteristics of the checkpoint area, rather 
than on any specific characteristics of the vehicles or persons 
involved. 
In Brignoni-Bonce you held that stops by roving patrols 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion. In Ortiz warrantless 
searches by roving patrols and searches at fixed checkpoints 
were held to be subject to the same standard (probable cause) 
because they are equally intrusive. You indicated that "the 
differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint would 
be significant in determining the propriety of the stop, which 
is considerably less intrusive than a search." 
I do not think that the intrusion of a stop-and-inquiry 
at a fixed checkpoint is so minimal that safeguards can be 
disposed of altogether. It is true that a stop by a roving 
patrol may be more intrusive than a stop at a checkpoint because 
of the embarrassment of being chased by a patrol car. But a 
significant intrusion remains - particularly where, as at the 
3. 
San Clemente checkpoint, only some of the cars are singled out 
for inquiry. I am sure as a practical matter those who appear 
to be Mexican are singled out more frequently than others. 
(This is unfortunate but, I think, inevitable.) The annoyance 
of being stopped and questioned is not insignificant, especially 
to those many travellers who are trying to get someplace fast. 
For a citizen who looks Mexican and is detained every time he 
passes the checkpoint, the annoyance must reach really frustrating 
proportions. The SG argues that a post hoc evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the stop at trial on a motion to suppress 
is sufficient. But much of the damage to the traveling public -
in particular, to the innocent public - is done before any 
smugglers or aliens are brought to trial. 
On the other side, we are faced with what appears to 
be an almost insurmountable law enforcement problem. The 
alternatives suggested are not convincing. Increasing the 
numbers on the border watch will not detect those who use 
illegal papers to cross the border. Subjecting the employers 
of aliens to criminal sanctions will discourage the employment 
of those legitimately within the country who look like they 
might be alien. I have some qualms about the ~ficacy of an 
area warrant in curbing police discretion, but I am willing to 
accept the conclusion that some almost random stops-and-inquiries 
are necessary to the effective detection of illegal aliens 
and the deterrence of illegal entry. 
I do think, however, that the intrusion on the 
innocent public described above requires at the least that 
4. 
the safeguard of an area warrant be used. It would be a marked 
departure from established principles of constitutional law 
to authorize stops and inquiries without probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, £E a warrant. License checks are carried 
on in this way, but they concern regulation of traffic upon 
the road (a kind of regulation that the travelling public assumes 
when it decides to use the highway) and are not conducive to 
any kind of focusing in terms of area or observable characteristics 
of the vehicle or the persons in it. I am not convinced that 
the requirement that the Border Patrol get an area warrant will 
frustrate law enforcement in a comparable way. Flexibility, 
to the extent that it is needed, can be provided for in the 
warrant, or by a series of warrants for various situations. 
And a warrant provides at least the possibility of some judicial 
oversight of the decisions of the Border Patrol officials and 
their operation of the checkpoints. 
My qualms about the area warrant is that it is not 
responsive to the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity: 
" . . . no warrants shall issue but . . . particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." Your Almeida-Sanchez concurrence posits that a 
5. 
substitute for "probable cause" can be devised in terms of 
an area, but the particularity problem cannot be so easily 
handled. Particularity was present in the warrants permitted 
by Camara, for the magistrate was required to focus on whether 
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for 
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a 
particular dwelling." 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). My fear is 
that in the absence of particularity the warrant becomes a 
license for the exercise of discretion, rathern than a curb 
upon discretion. An imaginative district court or magistrate 
could use the warrant requirement to ensure that the Border 
Patrol is acting wisely and with appropriate circumspection, 
but, as there are no standards to govern the officers' exercise 
of discretion, I fear that the area warrant in reality will 
become a mere rubber stamp. 
Also, if the area warrant is to have any substance, 
the court must at least conduct a thorough inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the "area" to be designated by the warrant, 
for that is the only check implicit in the concept of an area 
warrant. The checkpoints here are some sixty to ninety miles 
from the border. They are not in the *vast areas of uninhabited 
desert and arid land" along the border described in your 
Almeida-Sanchez concurrence. The Border Patrol argues that 
these are the most effective points, but surely it cannot be 
' ' 
6. 
allowed to pick the most effective p~int anywhere within 
the country. I think some nexus with the border is required. 
The stop becomes less intrusive as one approaches the border, 
for there is some expectation in the border regions that the 
Border Patrol will be conducting operations of this sort. 
Chris 
.. ,.l . ~. 
April 26, 1976 
No. 74-1560 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte 
No. 75-5387 Sifuentes v. U.S~ 
The purpose of this memorandum is merely to identify, 
for convenient reference, the relevant cases: 
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
U.S. v. Ortiz 
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce 
Bowen v. U.S . 
Search by roving patrol, without 
warrant or probable cause, held 
invalid. 
Search at San Clemente checkpoint, 
without probable cause or a warrant 
of any kind, held invalid in my 
opinion last June 
A stop {no search) by a roving 
patrol, when the only ground for 
suspicion was that the occupants 
appeared to be Mexican, was held 
invalid. 
Merely held that Ortiz (invalidating 
searches at checkpoints) should not 
be applied retroactively. In U.S. 
v. Peltier, we also declined to 
hold Almeida-Sanchez to be retroactive. 
The two cases now before the Court involve issues left 
open in the above cases: 
74-1560 u.s. v. 
Martinez-Fuerte 
Presents two issues left open in 
footnote 3 of Ortiz, namely: (i) 
the validity of a mere stop, and 
questioning, at a fixed checkpoint 
is valid in the absence of any 
individualized suspicion (such as 
was held to be required in 
Brignoni-Ponce); and (ii) whether, 
in any event, the area warrant that 
had been granted (pursuant to my 
suggestion in Almeida-Sanchez) 





This presents the same issue raised 
in Martinez-Fuerte with respect to 
the legality of a warrantless 
investigative stop at fixed 
immigration checkpoint. There was 
no area warrant in this case, and 
no individualized suspicion. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 4/26/76 
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April 26, 1976 
No. 74-1560 U.S. v Martinez-Fuerte 
No. 75-5387 Sifuentes v. U.S. 
The purpose of this memo is to identify, for convenient 
reference, possible distinctions suggested between stops at 
fixed checkpoints, and stops by roving patrols that were 
involved in Brignoni-Ponce. 
In Brignoni-Ponce we recognize .that Terry v. Ohio had 
said that whenever a police officer restrains the freedom 
of an individual ''to walk away" he has seized that person. 
We also said: 
"The reasonableness of such seizures depends 
on a balance between the public interest and 
the individual's right to personal security, 
free from arbitrary interference oy law 
officers. Terry at 20-21; Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537. 
Against the significant valid public interest in reducing 
the flow of illegal aliens into our country, the Court in 
Brignoni-Ponce: said: 
''. . • We must weigh the interference with 
individual liberty that results when an officer 
stops an automobile and questions its occupants. 
The intrusion is modest. The government tells 
us that a stop by roving patrol 'usually consumes 
no more than a minute'. ***Because of the 
limited nature of the intrusion, stops of this 
sort may oe justified on facts that do not amount 
to the probable cause required for an arrest." 
After discussing Terry and Adams v. Williams, we said: 
"In the context of border-area stops, the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
demands something more than the broad and unlimited 
l 
I 
discretion sought by the government. * * * 
To approve roving patrol stops of all vehicles 
in the border area, without any suspicion • • • 
would subject the residents of these and other 
areas to potentially unlimited interference 
with their use of the highways •••. 11 
2. 
The test approved by Brignoni-Ponce is whether there is 
ttreasonable suspicion to justify roving patrolastops". Where 
such suspicion exists, we said: 
"The officer may question the driver and passengers 
about their citizenship and immigration status, and 
he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, 
but any further detention or search must be based on 
consent or probable cause". 
In justifying allowing a roving patrol stop without 
WPobable cause, we said: 
". • • ecause of the importance of the 
governmental interests at stake, the minimal 
intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of 
practical alternatives for policing the border, 
we hold that when an officer's observation 
leads him reasonably to suspect that a particular 
vehicle may conta4n aliens who are illegally in the 
country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate 
the circumstances. . . . '' 
In United States v. Ortiz (search at a checkpoint), 
we noted two differences between fixed checkpoints and roving 
patrols that are "relevant to the constitutional issue": 
(i) the officer's discretion in deciding which cars to search 
"is limited by the location of the checkpoint'', a location 
that has been determined by high level border patrol officials 
using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to 
the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as 
the potential for detecting and deterring illegal movement 
of aliens; (ii) "the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint 
stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending 
3. ' 
a roving patrol stop. &oving patrols often operate at night 
oa seldom traveled roads, and their approach may frighten 
mdtorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that 
other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible s.~ 
of the officer's authority, and he is much less likely to 
be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. * * * Motorists 
whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned, 
may not be reassured by seeing that the border patrol searches 
other cars as well. Where only a few are singled out for a 
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"The officer may question the driver and passengers 
about their citizenship and immigration status, and 
he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, 
but any further detention or search must be based on 
consent or probable cause". 
In justifying allowing a roving patrol stop without 
pf obable cause, we said: 
" ... Because of the importance of the 
governmental interests at stake, the minimal 
intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of 
practical alternatives for policing the border, 
we hold that when an officer's observation 
leads him reasonably to suspect that a particular 
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the 
country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate 
the circumstances .... " 
In United States v. Ortiz (search at a checkpoint), 
we noted two differences between fixed checkpoints and roving .. - - -patrols that are "relevant to the constitutional issue": -(i) the officer's discretion in deciding which cars to search 
"is limited by the location of the checkpoint", a location 
that has been determined by high level border patrol officials 
using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to 
the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as 
the potential for detecting and deterring illegal movement 
of aliens; (ii) "the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint 
stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending 
3. 
a roving patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night 
on seldom traveled roads, and their approach may frighten 
motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that 
other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs 
of the officer's authority, and he is much less likely to 
be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. * * * Motorists 
whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned, 
may not be reassured by seeing that the border patrol searches 
other cars as well. Where only a few are singled out for a 
search, at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches 
especially offensive." 
L.F.P., Jr. 
74-1560 U.S. v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE ~ 'Jt1Argued 4/26/76 
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CHAM B E R S O F 
,ju:putttt <!fltltrl !tf tlrt ~~ ,jbdtll 
'llhtllfringhttt:. ~. <!f. 2ll&f'-!~ / 
J USTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
June 2, 1976 
RE: Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, et al. and Sifuentes v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
C HAMBERS OF 
..JUST ICE POTTER STEWART 
.ittpTttttt Q}~ud of tqt 'J{ttittlt ;itattg 
Jfagfri:ttgbm. ~. (!}. 2LT.;t'l-~ 
June 2, 1976 
Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 
U. S. v. Martinez-Fuerte 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in these cases. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr . Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~tqtrtmt <!Jo:ttrl o:f tift ~it~ ~hdtl¥ 
'~lhudrittghm. !}. <!f. zcgr~' 
June 2, 1976 
Re: 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v. 
Amado Martinez-Fuerte, et al. 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
.invrnnt <!Jcud cf tfrt ~ttitth .§ta:tts 
.. asfri:nghm. ~. <!J. 2llbf't~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 4, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1560 & 75-5387 -United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte 
Dear Lewis: 
I give up. Join me, at least for now. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.iu.puutt Qflturlllf tlrt ~tb ,jtatts 
jtu!rtttghtn:. ~. QJ:. 2llgt~~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 4, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte 
Dear Lewis: 
I intend to join your opinion. I offer two suggestions. 
In order to suggest some guidelines for the proposition, 
at page 16, that choice of location (and method of operation, 
at pages 21-22) of the permanent checkpoints will be subject 
to "post-stop judicial review," I would like the opinion to 
indicate that the reviewing court should pass on any claim 
) 
of arbitrariness in the context of the officials' acting 
pursuant to statutory and regulatory authority, and to 
suggest that if the choice is within those limits, it is 
entitled at least prima facie to a presumption of reasonableness. 
Hence, the following suggestion for the first full sentence 
at page 16: 
"Moreover, any claim that a particular exercise 
of discretion by these official& in locating 
or operating a permanent checkpoint, is arbitrary 
or irrational under applicable statutes and 
regulations 12a may be considered in a post-
stop judicial review." 
As to the language refuting any claim that a warrant 
is necessary, last sentence starting on page 21, I would 




suggest, if consistent with your intent, a cross-reference 
generally to the above. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
~nprtntt QJ01trt ~f f4t ~tb .itatts 
.. ufringhm. ~. QJ. 2ll&i~~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 4, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte 
Dear Lewis: 
I intend to join your opinion. I offer two suggestions. 
In order to suggest some guidelines for the proposition, 
at page 16, that choice of location (and method of operation, 
; 
at pages 21-22) of the permanent ~heckpoints will be subject 
to "post-stop judicial review," I would like the opinion to 
indicate that the reviewing court should pass on any claim 
of arbitrariness in the context of · tlie officials' acting 
pursuant to statutory and regulato~y authority, and to 
suggest that if the choice is within those limits, it is 
entitled at least prima facie to a presumption of reasonableness. 
Hence, the following suggestion for the first full sentence 
at page 16: 
"Moreover, any claim that a particular exercise 
of discre_tion by these official& in locating 
or operating a permanent checkpoint, is arbitrary 
or irrational under applicable statutes and 
regulations 12a may be considered in a post-
stop judicial review." 
As to the language refuting any claim that a warrant 
is necessary, last sentence starting on page 21, I would 
12a/ See n. 8, supra. 
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suggest, if consistent with your intent, a cross-reference 
generally to the above. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
.inprttttt Qfaurl ttf tlrt ~tb .itatts 
._ufringhm. ~. <!f. 2ll&i~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
June 8, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
No. 74-1560 and 75·5387 
Martinez-Fuerte 
Dear Bill: 
'Thank 'you for your letter. i am glad to try to make ' 
clearer how the opinion responds to your concern, which I 
share, that wiae discretion must oe left to the Border 
Patrol. I am reluctant, however, to use the phrase 
"arbitrary or irrational." This is something of a term 
of art in light of its use• elsewhere in the law. It is 
best, ·I think, to stick with the Fourth Amendment's standard 
of "reasonableness". I therefore propose the following for 
the first full sentence on page 16: 
"Moreover a claim that a particular exercise of 
; discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint. 
is unref~onable is subject to post-stop judicial 
review. a , 
12a. The choice of checkpoint locations must 
be left largely to the discretion of Border Patrol 
officials to be exercised in accordance with statutes 
and regulations that may be applicable. See n. 15, 
infra. Many ~ncidents of checKpoint operation also 
must be committed to the discretion of the officials 
in charge. But see infra at 22." 
I would insert on page 22 a cross 
passage. 
Sincerely, 
Mr . Justice Rebnquist 





Dear "· l. 
~~ 
-
I am glad to try to opwion 
t:o your concern, wnich I snare, t.hat wide discretion must 
left to t.:he .Border Patrol. I am reluctant, however, to use 
your proposed t>nrase "aroitrary or irr Lional. It Toe l)hraae ,, r • 
is something uf a term of arL: in ligh1.. of its use elsewhere , 
1.n the ·law, and I oelieve that it is best to stic~ with the ·:., 
,. Fourth 'Amendment 1 s own standard of "reasonaoaeness ''. I 
• therefore propose the following for the first full sentence 
at pa~e ··~l6: ·. · · · ' 
' '.~~~ ' ""'' ~ ~' l;j~··~' 'f~ 'oli of <)1:. '" L t 
·uj.'Joreover a claim tha1.. a particular exercise of 
discretion in locating or operating a cneckpoint 
;:v~:!~f~~nable ~s subject to, post-stop judicial 
,. 
~· 0 ¥ ~ 
12a·:· The choice of checkpoint: locations must · 
be left' largely to the discretion of 6order Patrol 
officials to be exercised in accordance with statutes 
and regulations tnat may be applicable. See n. 15, 
infra. ·Many J..ncidents of cnec.t.tl,)oinc operation also 
must be coDillitteo to the discretion of such officials •. 
But see infra at 22. 11 
inserting on page 22 a 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.prtmt arourtltf t4t ~~ .iht.tt• 
Jfulfinghtn. ~. ar. 2ll&f~.;l 
June 10, 1976 
Re: (74-1560 -United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
(75-5387 -Sifuentes v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your proposed opinion. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.hJttmu <!}~ ltf tltt ~nitt~ ,ihtttg 
Jl'a:gJri:n:ghtn. ~. <!}. 2ll~'!.;l 
June 14,7 
Re: No. 74-1560 - United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
No. 75-5387 - Sifuentes v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
-
~u:vttmt Qj:au.rt af ~lrt 'Jfutitt~ ~ta.¥s 
11JasJringtlttt. JB. (!f. 2.0pJ}c1 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 16, 197 6 
Re: No. 74-1560 --United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
'C 
F .1'1 
19, n. 6: . Substitute for 
beginning on the 
'llf; 
• whereas American citizens of Mexican 
ancestry and legally resident Mexican citizens constitute 
a significantly larger proportion of the population of ,, 
Southern California. The 1970 census figures, which may 
not fully reflect illegal aliens 1 show the population of '~~~" California to be approxtmately 1~,953,000 of whom some 
2,447 ,000, or 12%, are of Spanish or Mexican ancestry. , , , 
The equivalent percentages for metropolitan San Diego and :t 
Los Angeles are 11% and 15~ respectively. If the statewide 
population ratio is applied to the approximately 146,000 
vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area during . 
the eight days surrounding the arrests in No. 74-1560, , ~., 
roughly 17,500 would be expected to contain persons of ' 
Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 were referred to 
the secondary area. This appears to refute any suggestion r, 
that the Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent 
Mexican ancestry standing alone in referring motorists · to ., , 




Part VI, insert the following (note ~ l9)~ 
'< -~"···,!;;~. "' ··""' ' ~ ,., 
0 !• 
19. Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion 
reflects unwarranted concern in suggesting that today's 
decision marks a radical new intrusion on citizens' 
It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth Amendment .~.·- .. ~.~, 
protections", and states that the Court "virtually empties ;,.,: 
the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post, ,, ~·-· 
at 1, 2. Since 1946, Act of Aug. 7, 1946, 60 Stat-:-8'6'5,' ·, 
Congress has expressly authorized persons believed to be $ 
aliens to be interrogated as to residence and vehicles 
"within a reasonable distance" from the border to be 
searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The San Clemente . ) 
checkpoint has been operating at its present location ·~· 
throughout the intervening 30 years. Our prior cases hav.e 
limited significantly the reach of this Congressional , 
authorization, requiring probable cause for any vehicle . 
search in the interior and reasonable suspicion for inquiry 
stops by roving patrols. See supra at 11-12. Our holding 
today, approving routine stops £or brief questioning (a 
type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to 
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that .. 
neither longstanding Congressional authorization nor widely 
prevailing practices justify a Constitutional violation. ·· 
We do suggest, however, that against this background and ,/' 
in the context of our recent decisions, the rhetoric of 
the dissent , reflects unjustified concern. .,. , ,, · 
~,, llhl. I .;' ,, 
. ~ ,~ '': 
,~ , The dissenting opinion also asserts that "the 
stovped vehicles and their occuvants are. certainly subjected 
to search' as well as 'seizure ". Post, at 4. This 
is indeed novel doctrine. As early-as-United States v. Lee, 
274 u.s. 559, 563 (1927), Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking £or 
a unan~ous Court, held that a visual inspection of a ship 
aided by a searchlight was not a aearch within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. If such an inspection of a vessel 
is not a "search", one hardly would think that .~.looking through 
the windows of an automobile constituted a search. The 
more pertinent question is whether the enforcement agent 
has a right to be in the vantage point from which 
he makes his observation, as he does here because of 
3. 
his authority to make an inquiry stop. Moreover, in : 
Brignoni-Ponce, an opinion joined by Mr. Justice Brennan; 
we made clear that a stop for questioning involves "no 
search of the vehicle or its occupants". 422 U.S., at 880. 
The dissenting opinion further warns: 
"Every American citizen of Mexican 
ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully 
in this country must know after today's " 
decision that he travels the fixed check-
point highways at [his] risk • • • • " 
,, '1 
~· ~ 
~ ~.· ' . ~ ~~··«ft\; 
~, at 6. ~/· For the reason stated in n. 16, supra, thi~. . 
concern is misplaced. Moreover, upon a proper showing, )' 
courts would not be powerless to prevent the misuse of 
checkpoints, to harass those of Mexican ancestry. 
,' ...... 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.§npunu Qf!l1trl of tfrt ~.h .§taftg 
~a:;lrtttghttt, :!fJ. <If. 2ll.?'-1~ 




Holds for Nos. 74-1560 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte and 
75-5387 Sifuentes v. U.S. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 75-6112 Hart v. United States (heretofore Held for 
the Border Search cases). 
This petition for certiorari presents two unrelated 
cases. Both involve marijuana convictions in federal court. 
The marijuana was uncovered during two different searches 
conducted at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint. The convictions 
were affired by CA 5, came here last Term, and were vacated 
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Ortiz and 
Brignoni-Ponce. CA 5 again affirmed in both cases. 
The case of petitioners Dixon, Bylund, and Arnold 
presents no issue of interest. They concede that their 
convictions are valid if routine checkpoint stops are 
permissible. Martinez-Fuerte and Sifuentes thus control 
their case. 
Petitioner Hart's case presents a more substantial 
question. Hart was subjected to a routine search at the 
checkpoint. CA 5 has upheld his conviction on the ground 
that the Sierra Blanca checkpoint is the "functional 
equivalent" of the Border. I said in Last Term's Hold 
memo that, as the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border -
on an Interstate Highway, I doubt that it meets the CA 9 
standard for "functional equivalency." That standard 
2. 
requires a reasonable certainty that most cars passing 
the checkpoint will have come from the Border. See United 
States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960, 965-966 (CA 9 1974). 
On remand CA 5 said nothing to change this view. 
I therefore think the case was wrongly decided. But it has 
been here twice and twice reviewed by CA 5. I'm not 
inclined to take another "Border Patrol" case at this time. 
I will vote to Deny. 
t_ ~~~ rP. 
L.F.P.,Jr. 
To: The Chief' Justice 
Mr . . Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. .Tustice Powell 
Mr. ,Tustice R >hn.q'list 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
e!: From: Mr. Justice Brennan Circulated: ________ _ 1st DRAFT 
R ~irculated: --.::........,-....-.-/ 
~UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE& 
Nos. 74-1560 AND 75-5387 
\) 
Vnited States, Petitioner, l On Writ. of Certiorari tq 
74-1560 · v~ · the Umted States C~urt. 
A. d M t' F 1 of Appeals for the F1fth rna o ar mez- uerte eta. c· 't 
· . · · lrCUl • 
Rodolfo Sifuenws Petitioner l On Writ of Certiorari tq 
75-5387 v. · -' ' the United States Court 
· U 'ted ·S of Appeals for the 
m tates. N' th c· 't m 1rcm. 
[June -, 1976] 
MR JusTIC~ BRENNA~, with whom MR. JusTICE MAR., 
!'HALL joins, dissenting. 
Today's decision is the ninth this Term marking the 
continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Early 
in the Term, Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1976), permit-
ted the search of an automobile in police custody with-
out first obtaining a warrant despite the unreasonable-
ness of the custody and opportunity to obtain a warrant. 
United States v. Watson, - U. S. - (1976), held 
that regardless whether opportunity exists to obtain a 
warrant is never required to make an arrest in a public 
place for a previously committed felony, a result cer-
tainly not fairly supported by either history or precedent. 
See id. , at - (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting). United 
States v. Santana, - U. S. - ( 1976) , went further 
and approved the warrantless arrest for a felony of a per-
son standing on the front porch of her residence. United 
States v Miller, - U. S. - (1976) , narrowed the 
Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy by denying 
the existence of a protectible interest in the compila--
.Q 
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tion of checks, deposit slips, and other records pertaining: 
to an individual's bank account. Stone v. Powell, -
U. S. - (1976)', precluded the assertion of Fourth 
Amendment claims in federal collateral relief proceedings. 
United States v. Janis,- U. S.- (1976), held that 
evidence unconstitutionally seized by a state officer is 
admissible in a civil proceeding by or against the United 
States. South Dakota v. Opperman, - U. S. -
( 1976), approved inventory searches of automobiles in 
police custody. Finally, in Andresen v. Maryland, 
U. S. - ( 1976), the Court, in practical effect, weakened 
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against general 
warrants. 
Consistently with this purpose to debilitate Fourth 
Amendment protections, the Court's decision today vir-
tually empties the Amendment of its reasonableness 
requirement by holding that law enforcement officials 
manning fixed checkpoint stations who make standard-
less seizures of persons do not violate the Amendment. 
This holding cannot be squared with this Court's recent 
decisions in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 872 (1975); 
and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266-
( 1973). I dissent. 
While the requisite justification for permitting a 
search or seizure may vary in certain contexts, compare 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 ( 1964), with Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S. 1 (1968), and Carrnara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U. S. 523 ( 1967), even in the exceptional situations 
permitting intrusions on less than probable cause, it has 
long been settled that justification must be measured by 
objective standards. Thus in the seminal decision justi-
fying intrusions on less than probable cause, Terry v. 
Ohio, supra, the Court said: 
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes 
74-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT 
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meaningful only when it is assured that at some 
point the conduct of those charged with enforcing 
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, 
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in 
light of the particular circumstances. And in mak-
ing that assessment it is imperative that the facts, 
be judged a.gainst an objective standard . . . . Any-
thing less would invite intrusions upon constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this 
Court has consistently refused to sanction." Terry 
v. Ohio, supra, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
"This demand for specificity in the information 
upon which police action is predicated is the central 
teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence." I d., at 21 n. 18. 
Terry thus made clear what commonsense teaches: con-~ 
duct, to be reasonable, must pass muster under objective 
standards applied to specific facts. 
We are told today, however, that motorists without 
number may be individually stopped, questioned, visu-
ally inspected, and then further detained without even 
a showing of articulable suspicion, see ante, at 3, let 
alone the heretofore constitutional minimum of reason-
able suspicion, a result that permits search and seizure 
to rest upon "nothing more substantial than inarticulate 
hunches." This defacement of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections is arrived at by a balancing process that over-
whelms the individual's protection against unwarranted 
official intrusion by a governmental interest said to 
justify the search and seizure. But that method is only 
a convenient cover for condoning arbitrary official con-
duct, for the governmental interests relied on as warrant-
ing intrusion he~ are the same a& thoJ:ie in Almeida-
(4-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT 
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Sanchez and Ortiz, which required a showing of probable 
cause for roving-patrol and fixed checkpoint searches, 
and Brignoni-Ponce, which required at least a show-
ing of reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable 
facts to justify roving-patrol stops. Absent some dif-
ference in the nature of the intrusion, the same mini-
mal requirement should be imposed for checkpoint stops. 
The Court assumes, and I certainly agree, that persons 
stopped at fixed checkpoints, whether or not referred to 
a secondary detention area, are "seizedn within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, since the 
the vehicle and its occupants are subjected to a "visual 
inspection," the intrusion clearly exceeds mere physical 
restraint, for officers a.re able to see more in a stopped 
vehicle than in vehicles traveling at normal speeds down 
the highway. As the Court concedes, ante, at 14, the 
checkpoint stop involves essentially ""Th.e same intrusions 
as a roving-patrol stop, yet the Court provides on prin-
cipled basis for distinguishing checkpoint stops. 
Certainly that basis is not provided in the Court's 
reasoning that the subjective intrusion here is appre-
ciably less than in the case of a stop by a roving patrol. 
Brignoni-Ponce nowhere bases the requirement of rea-
sonable suspicion upon the subjective nature of the in-
trusion. In any event, the subjective aspects of check-
point stops, even if different from the subjective aspects 
of roving-patrol . stops, just as much require some prin-
cipled restraint on law enforcement conduct. The mo-
torist whose conduct has been nothing but innocent--
and this is overwhelmingly the case-surely resents his 
own detention and inspection. And checkpoints, unlike 
roving stops, retain thousands of motorists, a dragnet-
like procedure offensive to the sensibilities of free citi-
zens. Also, the delay occasioned by stopping hundreds 
of vehicles on a busy highway is particularly irritating. 
'14-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT 
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In addition to overlooking these dimensions of sub~ 
jective intrusion, the Court, without explanation, also 
ignores one major source of vexation. In abandoning 
any requirement of a minimum of reasonable suspicion, 
or even articulable suspicion, the Court in every prac-
tical sense renders meaningless, as applied to checkpoint 
stops, the Brignoni-Ponce holding that "standing alone 
[Mexican appearance] does not justify stopping all 
Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens." 1 422 
U. S., at 887. Since the objective is almost entirely the 
Mexican illegally in the country, checkpoint officials, un-
inhibited by any objective standards and therefore free 
to stop any or all motorists without explanation or ex-
cuse, wholly on whim, will perforce target motorists of 
Mexican appearance. The process will then inescapably 
discriminate against citizens of Mexican ancestry and 
1 Brignoni-Ponce, which involved roving-patrol stops, said: 
"[Mexican ancestry] alone would justify neither a reasonable belief 
that they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed 
pther aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers of 
native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical character-
istics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area 
a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. The likelihood that 
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to 
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it 
does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are 
aliens." 422 U.S., at 886-887. 
Today we are told that secondary referrals may be based on cri-
teria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop, and specifically 
that such referrals may be based largely on Mexican ancestry. 
Ante, at 19. Even if the difference between Brignoni-Ponce and this 
decision is only a matter of degree, we are not told what justifies the 
different treatment of Mexican appearance or why greater emphasis 
is permitted in the less demanding circumstances of a checkpoint. 
That law in this country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as 
probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any 
circumstance~!, 
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Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other rea-
son than that they unavoidably possess the same "sus-
picious" physical and grooming characteristics of illegal 
Mexican aliens. 
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every 
Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after 
today's decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint high-
ways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, 
but also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged 
and to an extent far more than non-Mexican appearing 
motorists. To be singled out for referral and to be detained 
and interrogated must be upsetting to any motorist. One 
wonders what actual experience supports my Brethren's 
conclusion that referrals "should not be frightening or 
offensive because of their public and relatively routine 
nature." Ante, at 16.2 In point of fact, referrals, viewed 
in context, are not relatively routine; thousands are 
permitted to pass. But for the arbitrarily selected mo-
torists who must suffer the delay and humiliation of 
detention and interrogation, the experience can obviously 
be upsetting.8 And that experience is particularly vex-l 
2 The Court's view that "selective referrals-rather than question-
ing the occupants of every car-tend to advance some Fourth 
Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general 
motoring public," ante, at 16, stands the Fourth Amendment on its 
head. The starting point of this view is the unannounced assump-
tion that intrusions are generally permissible; hence, any minimiza-
tion of intrusions serves Fourth Amendment interests. Under the 
Fourth Amendment, however, the status quo is nonintrusion, for as 
a general matter, it is unreasonable to subject the average cit1zen or 
his property to search or seizure. Thus, minimization of intrusion 
only lessens the aggravation to Fourth Amendment interests; 1t cer-
tainly does not further those interests. 
8 Ortiz expressly recognized that such selectivity is a source of 
embarrassment. "Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly re-
duce the likelihood of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are· 
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ing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selec~ \ 
tively referred, knowing that the officers' target is the 
Mexican alien. That deep resentment will be stirred 
by a sense of unfair discrimination is not difficult 
foresee.4 
In short, if a balancing process is required, the balance 
should be struck, as in Brignoni-Ponce, to require that 
border patrol officers act upon at least reasonable suspi-
searched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be re-
assured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as, 
well." 422 U. S., at 895. 
1 Though today's decision would clearly permit detentions to be· 
based solely on Mexican ancestry, the Court takes comfort in what 
appears to be the Border Patrol practice of not relying on Mexican 
ancestry standing alone in referring motorists for secondary deten-
tions. Ante, at 19 n. 16. See also id., at 22 n. 19. Good faith 
on the part of law enforcement officials, however, has never suf-
ficed in this tribunal to substitute as a safeguard for personal free-
doms or to remit our duty to effectuate constitutional guarantees . 
Indeed, with particular regard to the Fourth Amendment, Terry v. 
Ohio, supra, at 22, held that "simple '"good faith on the part of the 
arresting officer is not enough." . . . If subjective good faith alone 
were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would 
evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects," only in the discretion of the police.' Beck v. 
Ohio, supra, at 97 ." 
Even if good faith is assumed, the affront to the dignity of Mexi-
can citizens and Mexican aliens lawfully within the country is in no 
way diminished. The fact still remains that people of their ancestry 
are targeted for examination at checkpoints and that the burden of 
checkpoint intrusions will lie heaviest on them. That, as the Court 
observes, ante, at 19 n. 16, "[I] ess than 1% of the motorists passing 
the checkpoint are stopped for questioning," whereas approximately 
12% of the population of Cailfornia is of Spanish or Mexican 
ancestry, has little bearing on this point-or, for that matter, on 
the integrity of Border Patrol practices. There is no indication 
how many of the 12% have physcial and grooming characteristics 
identifiable as Mexican. There is no indication what portion of the 
motoring public in California is of Spanish or Mexican ancestry. 
Given the socioeconomic status of this portion, it is. likely that the-
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cion in making checkpoint stops. In any event, even if 
a different balance were struck, the Court cannot, with-
out ignoring the Fourth Amendment requirement of rea-
sonableness, justify wholly unguided seizures by officials 
manning the checkpoints. The Court argues, however, 
that practicalities necessitate otherwise: "A requirement 
that stops on major routes inland always be based on 
reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the 
flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particu-
larized study of a given car that would allow it to be 
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens." Ante, at 
13. 
As an initial matter, whatever force this argument 
may have, it cannot apply to the secondary detentions 
that occurred in No. 74-1560. Once a vehicle has been 
slowed and observed at a checkpoint, ample opportunity 
exists to formulate the reasonable suspicion which, if it 
actually exists, would justify further detention. Indeed, 
though permitting roving stops based on reasonable sus-
picion, Brignoni-Ponce required that "any further deten-
tion or search must be based on [the greater showing of] 
consent or probable cause." 422 U. S., at 882. The 
Court today, however, does not impose a requirement 
of even reasonable suspicion for these secondary stops. 
The Court's rationale is also not persuasive in that 
several of the factors upon which officers may rely in 
establishing reasonable suspicion are readily ascertain-
able, regardless of the flow of traffic. For example, with I 
checkpoint stops like with roving-patrol stops, where 
figure is significantly less than 12%. Neither is there any indica-
tion that those of Mexican ancestry are not subjected to lengthier 
initial stops than others, even if they are not secondarily detained . 
Finally, there is no indication of the ancestral makeup of the 1% 
who are referred for secondary detention . If, as is quite likely the 
case, it is overwhelmingly Mexican, the sense of discrimination 
which will be felt is only enhanced. 
74-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT 
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officers initially deal with a vehicle traveling, not at a 
crawl, but at highway speeds, " [a] spects of the vehicle 
itself may justify suspicion." United States v. Brignoni- ( 
Ponce, 422 U. S., at 885. Thus it is relevant that the 
vehicle is a certain type of station wagon, appears to be 
heavily loaded, contains an extraordinary number of per-
sons, or contains persons trying to hide. See ibid. If 
such factors are . satisfactory to permit the imposition 
of a reasonable suspicion requirement in the more de-
manding circumstances of a roving patrol, they clearly 
should suffice in the circumstances of a checkpoint stop. 
Finally, the Court's argument fails for more basic 
reasons. There is no principle in the jurisprudence of 
fundamental rights which permits constitutional limita-
tions to be dispensed with merely because they cannot 
be conveniently satisfied. Dispensing with reasonable 
suspicion as a prerequisite to stopping and inspecting 
motorists because the inconvenience of such a require-
ment would make it impossible to identify a given car 
as a possible carrier of aliens is no more justifiable than 
dispensing with probable cause as prerequisite to the 
search of an individual because the inconvenience of 
such a requirement would make it impossible to identify 
a given person in a high-crime area as a possible carrier 
of concealed weapons. "The needs of law enforcement 
stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protec-
tions of the individual against certain exercises of official 
power. It is precisely the predictability of these pres-
sures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional 
safeguards." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, 
at 273. 
The Court also attempts to justify its approval of 
standardless conduct on the ground that checkpoint stops 
"involve less discretionary enforcement activity" than 
roving stops. Ante, at 15, This view at odds with its 
74-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT 
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I 
later more revealing statement that "officers must have 
wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted 
for the brief questioning involved." Id., at 20. Simi-
larly unpersuasive is the statement that "since field offi~ 
cers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, 
there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of in~ 
dividuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol 
stops." Id., at 15-16.5 The Fourth Amendment stand~ 
ard of reasonableness admits of neither intrusion at the 
discretion of law enforcement personnel nor abusive or 
harassing stops, however infrequent. Action based 
merely on whatever may pique the curiosity of a par-
ticular officer is the antithesis of the objective standards 
requisite to reasonable conduct and to avoiding abuse l 
and harassment. Such action, which the Court now 
permits, has expressly been condemned as contrary to 
basic Fourth Amendment principles. Certainly today's 
holding is far removed from the proposition emphati-
cally affirmed in United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972), that "those charged 
with ... investigative and prosecutorial duty should not 
5 As an empirical proposition, this observation is hardly self-
evident. No small number of vehicles pass through a checkpoint. 
Indeed, better than 1,000 pass through the San Clemente check-
point during each hour of operation. Ante, at 10. Thus there is 
clearly abundant opportunity for abuse and harassment at check-
points through lengthier detention and questioning of some individ-
uals or arbitrary secondary detentions. Such practices need not be I 
confined to those of Mexican ancestry. And given that it is easier 
to deal with a vehicle which has already been slowed than it is 
to observe and then chase and apprehend a vehicle travelling at 
highway speeds, if anything, there is more, not less, room for abuse 
or harassment at checkpoints. Indeed, in Ortiz, the Court was "not 
persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any meaningful extent the 
officer's discretion to select cars for search." 422 U. S., at 895. A 
fortiori, discretion can be no more limited simply because the ac-
tivity is detention or questioning rather than searching. 
74-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT 
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be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally 
sensitive means of pursuing their tasks. The historical 
judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that 
unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to 
pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook 
potential invasions of privacy .... " Indeed, it is far 
removed from the even more recent affirmation that "the 
central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect 
liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive inter-
ference by government officials." United States v. Ortiz, 
supra, at 895.6 
The cornerstone of this society, indeed of any free 
society, is orderly procedure. The Constitution, as 
originally adopted, was therefore, in great measure, a 
procedural document. For the same reasons the drafters 
of the Bill of Rights largely placed their faith in proce-
dural limitations on government action. The Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be 
reasonable enforces this fundamental understanding in 
erecting its buffer against the arbitrary treatment of cit-
izens by government. But to permit, as the Court does 
today, police discretion to supplant the objectivity of rea-
6 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), does not 
support the Court's result. Contrary to the Court's characteriza-
tion, ante, at 17, the searches condoned there were not "random 
intrusions." The Court required that administrative searches pro-
ceed according to reasonable standards satisfied with respect to 
each particular dwelling searched. 387 U. S., at 538. The search 
of any dwelling at the whim of administrative personnel was not 
permitted. The Court, however, imposes no such standards today, 
Instead, any vehicle and its passengers are subject to detention at 
a fixed checkpoint, and "no particularized reason need exist to 
justify" the detention. Ante, at 19. To paraphrase an apposite 
observation by the Court in Almeida-Sanchez, "[checkpoints] thus 
embody precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted 
that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed .... " 
413 U. S., at 270. 
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son and, thereby, expediency to reign in the place of 
order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safeguards 
and threaten erosion of the cornerstone of our system 
of a government, for as Mr. Justice Frankfurter re-
minded us, "The history of American freedom is, in no· 
small measure, the history of procedure." Malinski Vr 
New York, 324 U.S. 401,414 (1945). 
~~ lfp/ss 7/1/76 
74-1560 U.S. v. Martinez•Fuerte 
75-5387 Sifuentes v "':" U.S. 
~w-~7/~/7~ 
I have the opinion for the Court in these two cases 
which present the same issue. 
The problem arises from the alien~ho enter the 
United States illegally, primarily from Mexico. The border 
with Mexico is almost 2,000 miles long. There are several 
million aliens/ illegally in the country,j most of whom 
crossed the Mexican border surreptitiously. They avoid 
lawful ports of entry;~cross on foot at various points;j and 
rendezvous with smugglers, j who transport them inland. 
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland traffic~ 
checking operations: roving patrols, temporary checkpoints, 
and permanently located checkpoints. 
The stopping for questioning,;'and sometimes searching, / 
of vehicles suspected of transporting aliensj'has produced 
hundreds of litigated cases, especially in the federal 
courts of Texas and California. These cases, several of 
which have come to us in recent years, often present 
di fficult Fourth Amendment issues. 
We are concerned today~with the operation of two 
- triU.. ""'-' CI..L.l- ""-~ ~ T ~~· 
permanent checkpointsA f he defendants in these cases were 
stopped for questioning, and aliens were found in both 
vehicles. 
2. 
The issue presentedJ'is whether the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against "searches and seizures"/ was violated 
by routine checkpoint stops of vehiclesJ'on a public highwa~ 
for questioning of occupants. These stops are made where 
there is neither probable cause/ nor any reasonable suspicion 
for believing the vehicle contained illegal aliens. 
At the San Clemente checkpoint, involved in one of 
these cases, during an eight-day period in 1974, some 
146,000 vehicles passed the checkpoint. All were slowed to 
a few miles per hourJ'for a fleeting visual inspection. 820 
vehicles were selectedJ'nd referred to a secondary areaJ'for 
routine questions as to citizenship. Of the 820 vehicles, 
171 were found to be transporting a total of 725 deportable 
aliens. The questioning usually takes not more than 3 to 5 
minutes. 
The ~opping of motorists on highwaysJ'for various 
inquiries - license checks, weight-limit inspections, fruit 
and vegetable inspections, and the like - is familiar to all 
motorists. 
We hold that stops for brief questioning,j'routinely 
conducted at an official checkpoint,~re wholly consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment. The intrusion on privacy, and the 
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with the Fourth Amendment. The intrusion on privacy, and the 
3. 
limitation on freedom of movement, are minimal. The 
public interest, and the need for this modest enforcement 
technique, have been demonstrated abundantly by the records 
before us. 
* * * * 
Accordingly, we reverse No. 74-1560, here from the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and affirm 75-5387, 
here from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
* * * * 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion, 
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To: Mr. Putzel 
From: Chambers of Justice Powell 
Re: Lineup for Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-1560 
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Burger, C.J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rhenquist, and Stevens, 
JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 





































---- 16 or--, 
(Slip Opinion) 
NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-
leased, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
/ 0 h> I 2. 1'2.C . , Llf, .rM.., ~<f d4. - II 
IJ ~ ~T~ES v. MART~EZ-FUERTE ET AL. 
~H-1/ /Z.. 1'3> 
/.AI'- CERTIORARI TO fHE tl~D STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
~~T~~~ II '24.!..-ol~i_,A.. ...... ~~\.' 
'' ..--.. No. 74-1tj,PO ... Argued April 26, 197,6-Decided July , 1976·X· ,• 
/~~·~ .... 13 
1. The Border Pafrol's routine stopping of a vehicle at a 
/2._ 
~pef~w~~<;l<l>~i1tt..#l9~d,o.rJ ~~M~~~ 
thiMe'Xicari "5{ifdei1QTb~stioni'ilg ortbe;elilcle's ~c.:y-. _ J-. 
pants is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and th~~ - 2..0 
and questioning may be made at reasonably located checkpoints 
in the absence of any individualized suspicion that the particular 
vehicle contains illegal aliens. Pp. 12-20. 
(a) To require that such stops always be based on reason-
able suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic 
tends to be too heavy to allow tho particularized study of a 
given car necessary to identify it as a possible carrier of illegal 
aliens. Such a requirement also would largely eliminate any 
deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, 
even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly. 
Pp. 12-14. 
(b) While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is 
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests 
is quite limited, the interference with legitimate traffic being 
minimal and checkpoint operations involving less discretionary 
enforcement activity than roving-patrol stops. Pp. 14-16. 
(c) Under the circumstances of these checkpoint stops, which 
do not involve searches, the Government or public interest in 
making such stops outweighs the constitutionally protected inter-
est of the private citizen. Pp. 16-18. 
(d) With respect to the checkpoint involved in No. 74-1560, 
it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to a secondary 
·X·Together with No. 75-5387, Sifuentes v. United States, on cer-
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MARTINEZ AND SIFUENTES 
Outline of May 10 Draft Opinion 
The purpose of dictating this outline is to assist 
in giving me an "overview" of the entire draft. My 
impression from a first reading is that (i) there is a 
substantial amount of repetition, both of facts and 
reasoning; (ii) there may be some unnecessary arguments 
advanced; and (iii) as is often the case with a first 
draft, the writing itself lacks the degree of conciseness 
are 
and unity thatxaxa desirable. 
I. 
A. 
The facts are stated in No. 75·1560 (pp. 1-6) 
B. 
The facts are stated in No. 75-5387 (pp. 6·8) 
Comment: 
The facts are well stated. I doubt that much is 
to be gained by trying to condense them. 
2. 
II. 
This part (pp. 9-15) describes the overall problem 
very well, and properly focuses primarily on the Mexican 
alien. There is also a summary (p. 14) of the statistics 
with respect to the San Clemente checkpoint. 
This Part II is a useful background for the rest of 
the opinion. I believe, however, that subsequent portions 
of the opinion repeat to some extent - perhaps more than 
necessary - information in Part II. This impression needs 
to be verified. 
III. 
A. 
Subpart A (p. 15-18) is a relatively simplistic 
summary of Fourth Amendment principles. As these have 
been summarized many times in our cases, I am not sure 
that a recapitulation here is either necessary or desirable. 
The more relevant Fourth Amendment cases are cited or 




This contains a summary of prior border patrol cases 
decided recently by the Court. Again, this may be useful 
although it results in some later repetition. As I dictate 
this, I am inclined to think Subpart A (general discussion 
of elementary Fourth Amendment principles) could be omitted, 
accompanied by some modest revision - referring to the 
general principles - of Subpart B. 
IV 
This purports to set the framework for a 11balancing" 
or .. weighing" of the competing pxim private and public 
interests involved. 
Subpart A (p. 21-22) correc~and persuasively 
/\.. 
concludes that the intrusion or interferxence with 
the right of free passage is min~al. ~~~es not 
"/U.t Vv-~1~ 
require much weigh on theG other side of the scales to 
1 t 
counterbalance the limited personal interest. Yet, 
Subpart B (p. 23-25) presents the public interest very 
well and perhaps more fully than is required in light 
f 
4. 
of what has been said above in Part II. Nevertheless, 
I did not commence to feel that the opinion was becoming 
unnecessarily prolix until after I moved beyond Subpart B. 
I particularly like what is said on page 24. 
c. 
This subpart gives me some difficulty. It addresses 
the defendant's argument that at least there should be 
reasonable suspicion at a checkpoint of the type described 
in Brignoni•Ponce as necessary for a roving patrol stop. 
It seems to me that the draft already has virtually disposed 
of this argument in Subpart A of Part IV. I suggest a 
consolidation of 11. Subparts A and C. Such a revision might 
identify the defendant's contention early in the discussion. 
The defendant, in light of Brignoni-Ponce does not contend 
that probable cause is necessary but only reasonable 
suspicion. Thus, we need to meet this argument by 
emphasizing the distinction between the roving patrol 
and the fixed checkpoint stops, concluding that the 
.. 
\ 
, . . 
5. 
tatatx.dt individual's interest - the degree of intrusion -
is less in the latter type stop. At that point, the 
competing interests of the public in the apaa operation 
of the fixed checkpoints can be presented. 
Pc~l---Subparagfaph D (pp. ii 31·33) addresses the argument 
made in the San Clemente case that pulling motorists off 
to a secondary area is a significant added intrusion. 
This. argument certainly must be met but it seems to me 
that the draft YlntBZxaan "overreacts" to it. At the 
outset of the opinion, the operation of the San Clemente 
checkpoint- with~e secondary area and the total delay 
of only three to five minutes - have been discussed. The 
entire analysis with respect to a nstop", including the 
distinguishing of Brignoni-Ponce, applies to the entire 
"stop and questioning" operation at San Clemente. I think 
we can recognize, perhaps in a single paragraph, that there 
is a difference in degree between a stop on the main 






out of a vehicle for movement to the secondary area. 
But. as the draft notes, there is a legitimate reason -
volume of traffic - for this different type of treatment. 
It may require a somewhat longer delay of the traveler 
but the substance of the intrusion is the same: it is 
limited to a stop for a particularized purpose, namely, 
the identification of the occupants. This occurs, even 
at San Clemente, as a routine operation in the presence 
of several officers and on a regularized basis. There 
is, of course, no search. 
In short, I would not overdignify this particular 
argument of the Martinez defendants. 
v 
This brief part (p. 34-36) meets Sifuentes' argument 
that a warrant is required to authorize routine stops 
at a checkpoint. As we ka8 have already held, in the 
preceding parts of the opinion, that neither probable 
cause nor reasonable suspicion is required for a checkpoint 
stop, I would have thought we could have disposed of this 
' \ 
7. 
Sifuentes argument in suiiJllary fashion. To be sure, the 
draft of Part V is only 2·1/2 pages long. But it may 
distract the reader (as it did me to some extent) to be 
confronted with this new argument after the opinion already 
has disposed of the more exacting arguments. Putti~this 
differently) if a stop at a fixed checkpoint may be made 
without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, it 
goes almost without saying that the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment is not applicable. It would be a little 
like saying that, after the Court had decided Terry, a warrant 
still was required to make the "stop and frisk". 
I wonder whether it is not iBK feasible to move the 
Sifuentes contention forward to somexaEk& earlier point 
in the draft and dispose of it in a paragraph or even in 
a footnote . If this is done, you may need to address 
Camara to the point of distinguishing it. 
8. 
Vl 
I also have difficultyw with Part VI. It comes, 
at least so it seems to me, as a distinct anticlimax. 
If necessary at all, I would certainly condense it sharply. 
I agree that the Court of Appeals discussion of the 
inappropriateness of the location of San iB Clemente came 
(as I recall) in its discussion of my suggestion in 
Almeida-Sanchez. Since we have indicated early in the 
draft that the area warrant issue need not be considered 
in this case, I would prefer not to "back into it" near 
.. , 
the end of the opinion. Apart from disturbing the symmetry 
and flow of the opinion, I have in mind that several Justices 
stated at the Conference a desire not to reach the area 
warrant issue. I do think it necessary to say somewhere 
that the location of a checkpoint is an administrative 
decision not to be disturbed in the absence of a showing 
that the location bears no reasonable relation to the 
government's purpose. 
At the bottom of page 38, the draft assumes that 
the defendants make the general argument that the San 
9. 
Clemente checkpoint itself is unconstitutionally located. 
I do not recall an argument being made in precisely these 
terms. The issue would arise only in the context of an 
individual being stopped- If he were stopped in downtown 
Los Angeles, the location of the checkpoint would be one 
of the factors to be considered. But would anyone have a 
a ~ particular location is unconstitutional? Even if so, 
that is not the case before us. 
I would suggest that we not identify a generalized 
,,. 
attack on the location of San Clemente as a separate issue. 
Rather, it could be included far more briefly as a element 
in the nature and extent of the intrusion upon defendant's 
freedom of movement. Arguably, I suppose, there is a 
something to be said for the view that it is worse to be 
stopped on a busy, express highway, than on the different 
J~• type of highway involved in Sifuentes. On the other 
hand, arguments to the contrary are quite conceivable . 
* * * * * 
t i ,• 
10. 
My observations above are not definitive. They 
reflect my preliminary impressions from reading the draft, 
and 1 may well defer to your more thorough knowledge of 
these cases. 
1 am certain that a 41-page opinion is too long. 
And, apart from length alone, this draft lacks the 
cohesion and unity are characteristic of kB your more 
finished products. In short, 1 suggest that you proceed 
w~th a second draft that moves somewhat more swiftly and 
tightly in its analysis and arguments. 
Having said all of this, 1 recognize that you have 
achieved a near miracle in producing any draft at all in 
three or four days. Moreover, 1 recognize this as an 
excellent first effort and imply no negative thoughts as 
to the merit and usefulness of the draft. 
1 particular appreciate your anxiety to give me an 
"early shot" at one of our Court opinions. 1 suggest now 
that you take your time to produce a second draft, perhaps 
planning to get it to me by Monday morning, May 17. ikaa 
This k should enable us to come up with a Chambers draft 
before 1 leave for the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference. 
" " lfp/ss 5/19/76 ltider A, p . 14 (Border Search) 
The record in No. 75•5387, with respect to the 
Sarita chec~point,does not provide comparable statistical 
information. As the highway there carries substantially 
less traffic than at Sam Clemente, it may be assumed that 
fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there. But fewer 
pass by undetected, as every motorist is questioned. 
I 
l 
lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A1 p. 16 {Border Search) 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops .are "seizures" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants 
therefore contend primarily that the random stopping of 
vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brisnoni-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing stops in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion. Defendants also contend, alternatively, 
that checkpoint stops in the absence of such suspicion are 
p ermissible only when the practice has the advance judicial 
authorization of a valid warrant. As we reach the argument 
of a warrant requirement only if reasonable suspicionis 
not required for these stops, we turn first to defendants' 
principal contention that there must be articulable facts 
justjfying reasonable suspicion as a pr~quisite to any 
8a 
valid stop. 
lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A, p. 18 <Border Search) 
The government argues persuasively that the operation 
of routine checkpoints, as in these cases, is the most 
effective means of monitoring the major routes inland. 
, .. 
A requirement that stops at such checkpoints be 
lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A, p. 19 (Border Search) 
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
be seen without a search. We view such a checkpoint stop 
in a different light from a roving patrol stop. The 
objective intrusion - the stop itself, questioning and 
visual inspection - is equally limited in both cases. 
But the subjective intrusion - the generating of concern 
or even fright on the part of lawful travelers - is ~ 





lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A, p. 20 (Border Search) 
MOtorists regularly using these highways know, or 
may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints. 
Second, the regularized manner in which these fixed check-
points ar e operated minimizes the opportunity for abuse of 
authority, and reassures law-abiding motorists that the 
stops are routinely made in the public iaax interest. 
Finally, the location of fixed checkpoints is not chosen 
by officers is the field, but by officials responsible 
for making overall decisions as to the most effective 
allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may 
assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a 
checkpoint where it bears disproportionately or oppressively 
on motorists as a class. Moreover, while the choice of 
a checkpoint location must be left largely to the 
discretion of these officials, the reasonableness of a 
given location is subject to judicial review. 
; 
lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A, p. 22 (Border Search) 
Defendant't.} basic position is that government officials 
may stop no motorist on a public highway for questioning 
in the absence of individualized suspicion. This is 
tantamount to saying no such stops ever may be made on 
normally traveled highways as, absent a capability of 
following a passing vehicle, there si~ply is insufficient 
opportunity to justify selecting a particular vehicle from 
a stream of passing traffic. The logic of defendants' 
position would preclude one of the standard means employed 
by governments at state and local levels of enforcing laws 
with respect to drivers' licenses, safety inspections, 
weight limits, and s~ilar matters. As such laws are not 
before us, we intimate no view at this time other than to 
note that the practice of stopping motor vehicles briefly 
for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility, 
and is a practice which motorists generally accept as 
incident to highway use. 
We are unwilling to extend Fourth Amendment principles 
to preclude the stopping of motorists for brief questioning 
and 
under reasonable circumstances/for a legitimate purpose. 
2. 
No decision of this Court has gone so far, and the rationale 
of prior decisions support the view that we affirm today. 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 623 (1967) the Court 
required an "area warrant" supporting the reasonableness 
of inspecting private residences for building code violations 
within a particular area, but recognized thereby that neither 
probable cause nor individualized suspicion was required to 
enter any particular building. In so holding, the Court 
examined the governmental interest advanced to justify a 
recognized "intrusion upon the constitutional protected 
interests of the private citizen", id. at 535, and concluded -
under the circumstances that such interest outweighed that 
of the private citizens. Moreover in this case we are 
concerned neither with searches nor with the sancity of 
private dwellings. One's expectation of privacy in an 
automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly 
different from the traditional expectation of privacy in 
a home or office. Chambers v. Meroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970); 
~· v. Ortiz, supra, n. 2 at ___ . 
3. 
The purpose of the stops by the Border Patrol in the 
cases before us is legitimate and in the public interest. 
We also think the circumstances under which the stops were 
made and the procedures followed reasonably further the 
governmental purpose with a minimum intrusion ·upon Fourth 
Amendment interests. Accordingly, we hold that the stops 
and questioning at issue may be made in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion. 
We further believe that it is constitutional ~o 
refer motorists selectively to the secondary inspection 
area at the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria 
that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even 
if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on 
9 
the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no 
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at ___ • As the intrusion here is sufficiently 
minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify 
it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol officers h.:.:. 
must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be 
10 
diverted for the brief questioning here involved. 
.. 
1 lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A, p. 22 (Border Search) 
Defendant's basic position is that government officials 
may stop no motorist on a public highway for questioning 
in the absence of individualized suspicion. This is 
tantamount to saying no such stops may be made on normally 
traveled highways as, absent a capability of following a 
passing vehicle, there simply is insufficient opportunity 
to make .the necessary observations to justify selecting a 
particular vehicle from a stream of passing traffic. The 
logic of defendants• position would preclude, for example, 
one of the standard means employed by governments at state 
and local levels to enforce laws with respect to drivers' 
licenses, safety inspections, weigh limits, and similar 
matters. As such laws are not before us, we intimate no 
view at this time other than to note that the practice of 
stopping motor vehicles briefly for questioning has a 
long history, and is a practice with which motorists are 
fully familiar. 
We are unwilling to extend Fourth Amendment principles 
to preclude the stopping of motorists for brief questioning 
under reasonable circumstances and for a legitimate purpose. 
2. 
No decision of this Court has gone so far, and the rationale 
of prior decisions support the view that we affirm today. 
(1967) 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 ~. ~. 523/~ the Court 
required an "area warrant$ supporting the reasonableness 
of inspecting private residences for building code violations, 
but recognized thereby that neither probable cause nor 
I 
individualized suspicion was required to enter any 
particular building. In so holding, the Court examined 
the governmental interest advanced to justify a recognized 
"int rusion upon the constitutional protected interests of 
the private citizen", i d. at 535, and concluded that - . 
the governmental interest outweighed that of the private 
citizens. 
-- lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A1 g. 24 (Border Search) 
Defendants' alternative argument is that, in any 
event, random checkpoint stops at a checkpoint must be 
12 
authorized by a judicial warrant. It is suggested that 
a warrant requirement in these circumstances draws some 
report from Camara, where the Court held that a warrant 
was required to conduct a building code inspection, even 
though there was no cause to believe that there were 
11 
violations in a particular building. We do not think 
that Camara is an apt model. It involved the search of 
private residences and offices, for which a warrant 
traditionally has been required. See,~·&·, MCDonald 
v. United States, supra. As developed more fully above, 
the Fourth Amendment interests that normally justify 
the warrant requirement are absent here. The degree of 
intrusion upon privacy of a search of an automobile 
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with 
privacy resulting from a stop for questioning as to 
citizenship. Moreover, other supportive purposes served 
by the warrant requirement are inapplicable. One such 
purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the 
2. 
evaluation of reasonableness of a search or seizure. 
See --------- v. 
_____ , u.s. . _, United States 
v. United States District Court, supra, at -· The 
reasonableness of checkpoint stops, however, turns on 
the location and method of operation of the checkpoint, 
factors that are not susceptible to the distortion of 
hindsi~ht, and therefore will be open to post-stop review 
notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose 
for a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment 
of the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing 
officer, !a·, at ___ $;but the need for this is less 
evident when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in 
the hands of the officer in the field. 
Note to Car 1 : 
Part V, as you know has concerned me. I have not 
had an opportunity to review again carefully the briefs 
and opinions below (as I should and hope to be able to do). 
I accept your conclusion that the warrant argument is made 
with sufficient specificity to require answering. 
It is still not clear to me, however, whether the 
argument is supportive of the type of area warrant that 
3. 
I described in Almeida-Sanchez, or whether some other type 
of warrant is said to be necessary. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit devoted a large of its opinion to 
rejecting the area warrant idea, and I had thought that 
defendants agreed with CA9 in this respect. It is not 
clear to me, from what has been said either by you or 
me in Part V, whether we are talking about the type of 
warrant that actually was issued in Martinez (and found 
to be deficient in various respects) or whether defendants 
have described some other type of warrant. I assume 
defendants a~e aot suggesting that a warrant must be 
issued prior to eaQ.h stop - an absurdity on its face. 
In sum, I think Part V needs clarification. The 
revision I have suggested is as vague on this point as 
your draft, as I am not presently advised as to exactly 
what type of warrant defendants contend that the Fourth 
Amendment requires. 
lfp/ss 5/19/76 Rider A, p. 24 (Border Search) 
Defendants• alternative argument is that, in any 
event, random stops at a checkpoint must be authorized 
12 
by a judicial warrant. It is suggested that a warrant 
requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that an area warrant 
was required to conduct a building code inspection, even 
though there was no cause' to believe that there were 
violations in any particular building. 
We do not think that Camara is an apt model. It 
involved the search of ,. private residences and offices, 
for which a warrant traditionally has been required. 
See, ~·&·• McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the Fourth Amendment~ interests that 
normally justify the warrant requirement are absent here. 
The degree of intrusion upon privacy that may be occasioned 
by a search of a house or even an automobile hardly 
can be compared with the minor interference with 
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as to 
citizenship. Moreover, other supportive purposes served 
by the warrant requirement are inapplicable. One such 
purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the 
lfp/ss 5/21/76 Rider A, p. 20 (Border Search Cases) 
MOtorists using these highways are not taken by 
surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the 
location of the checkpoints. The regularized manner in 
which established checkpoints are operated is visible 
evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the 
stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the 
public interest. 
lfp/ss 5/21/76 Rider (Border Search Cases) 
Note to Carl: I continue to think that the "administrative" 
stops relating to use of the highways are relevant. Violations 
of laws regulating such use result in criminal penalties, 
often revocation of a driver's license - a very serious 
penalty. These are no more "administrative" than the 
searches in Camara, where the Court rejected a total 
distinction - as I recall - between administrative and 
searches intended to implement the criminal law. I am 
willing to leave this reference out of the text, but would 
like to add a footnote along the following lines: 
"The logic of defendants' position, if realistically 
pursued, would deprive goverrunent officials at all levels 
from ever stopping motorists on public highways for 
questioning in the absence of individualized suspicion. 
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those here 
involved, are used widely by governments at state and local 
levels as one means of enforcing laws with respect to 
drivers' licenses, safety inspections, weigh limits and 
similar matters. As such laws are not before us, we 
intimate no view with respect to them at this time other 
than to note that the practice of stopping motor vehicles 
briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its 
utility, and is a practice which motorists accept as 
incident to highway use. The fact that the purpose of such 
laws is said to be administrative is irrelevant when weighing 




LFP/gg 5-21-76 Border Search Cases 
Rider A, p. 22 
The defendants note correctly that individualized suspicion 
is usually a prerequisite to a consttutional search or 
seizure. See Terry v • .Q.h!.2, 392 U.s. _, and n. __ • 
But the Fourth Amendment ~poses no irreducible requirement 
of such suspicion. This is clear from Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, supra, at _ (Powell, J., concurring); 
~.; at _____ (White, J., dissenting); eollonoade Catering 
Corp. v. United States, 397 u.s. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 u.s. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, supra, 
at---· In Camara the Court required an "area warrant" 
supporting the reasonableness of inspecting private residences 
for building code violations within a particular area, but 
expressly recognized that neither probable cause nor 
individualized suspicion was r•quired to enter any particular 
'residence. In so holding, the Court examined the governmental 
interest advanced to justify a recognized "intrusion upon 
the constitutionally protected interest of the private 
citizen", id. at 535, and concluded that under the -
circumstances such interest outweighed that of the p~ivate 
citizens. In this case we are concerned neither with 
2. 
searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily 
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. 
See,~·~·· H£Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 ( ). 
As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in 
an automobile and of freedom in ita operation are significantly 
different from the traditional expectation of privacy in 
one's residence. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42, 48 
(1970); ~· v. Ortiz, supra, at ____ , n. 2. 
The purpose of the stops by the Border Patrol 
' ' 
in the cases before us is legitimate and in the publ'ic 
interest. We also think the circumttances under which the 
stops were made and the procedures followed reasonably 
I 
further the governmental purpose with a minimum intrust.on . 
upon Fourth Amendment interests. Accordingly, we hold 
that the stops and questioning at issue may be made in the 
absence of individualized suspicion. 
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses 
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. 
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint 
operated by the Border Patrol away from the interna-
tional border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion 
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of 
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth 
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth 
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether 
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief 
questioning of its occupants even though there is no 
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal 
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold 
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a 
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by 
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2 UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
I 
A 
The respondents in No. 74-1560 arc defendants in 
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made 
in three different occasions at the permanent immigra-
tion checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. 
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego 
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is 
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. W c pre-
viously have had occasion to describe the checkpoint as 
follows: 
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large blaek on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, 
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a 
mile further north are two black on yellow signs 
suspended over the highway with flashing lights 
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the 
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of 
California weighing station, are two large signs with 
flashing red lights suspended over the highway. 
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OF-
FICERS." Placed on the highway arc a number 
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes 
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, 
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks 
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes art' offi-
cial U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary 
detention facilities. There arc also floodlights for 
nighttime operation.'" United States v. Ort1"z, 
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Rupp. 398, 410-411 (ED Cal. 1973). 
J 
I 
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The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of 
traffic screens visually all northbound vehicles, which the 
checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, stop.1 
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with-
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a 
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will 
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs 
~ cars to a secondary inspection area, where ~ 
pants are asked about their citizenship and immigration 
status. The Government informs us that at San Cle-
mente the average length of an investigation in the sec-
ondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief 
for Government 53. A direction to stop in the secondary 
inspection area could be based on something suspicious 
about a particular car passing through the checkpoint, 
but the Government concedes that none of the three 
stops at issue in No. 74-1560 ase on any articu-
lable suspicion. During the period when these stops 
were made, the San Clemente checkpoint was operating 
under a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which au-
thorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop 
operation at the Sa.n Clemente location.2 
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved 
in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the case. 
Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached the San 
1 The parties disagree as to whether Yehiclcs not rcf<'rrcd to the 
secondary inspection area arc brought to a complete halt or merely 
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Rr~olntion of this dispute 
is not necessary here, as we may [ I sumc, arguendo, that, all motor-
ists passing through the checkpoint a,re 80 slowed as to have been 
"seized." 
2 The "warrant of inspection" was sought because the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit alrrady had held that random check-
point stops could not be made abRent such a. warrant. See United 
States v. Esquer-R·ivcra, 500 F . 2cl 313 (1974) , Sec also n. , 
in fra. 
74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION 
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Clemente checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two 
female passengers. The women were illegal Mexican 
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro 
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused 
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego, to be transported 
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to 
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro-
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident 
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the 
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts 
of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. 
~ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evi-
dence obtained at the chrC'kpoint on the ground that its 
operation was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 
The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted 
on both counts after a jury trial. 
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass 
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing 
a passenger who had been smuggled across the border at 
San Ysidro and picked up for transportation by pre-
arrangement. Questioning a.t the checkpoint revealed 
the illegal status of the passenger, and Jiminer,-Garcia 
was charged in two counts with illegally transporting an 
alien, 8 U. S. C. ~ 1324 (a) (2), and conspiring to commit 
tha.t offense. 18 U. S. C. ~ 371. His motion to suppress 
the evidence derived from the stop was granted. 
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Famando Me-
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen 
:lEach of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in 
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony 
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. B1ig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]hore may be 
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a. witness at triaJ, 
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized 
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . ." The 
question a.gajn is not before us. 
,\· 
74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION 
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driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passen-
gers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area. re-
vea.led that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal 
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three 
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan 
had led the other aliens across the border at the beach 
near Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with a 
United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan 
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans-
porting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of 
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4), 
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress. 
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the 
Gov-ernment appealed the granting of the motions to 
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jininez-Garcia 
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barra.gan. 4 The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three 
appeals, which presented the common question whether 
the routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment." The Court 
of Appeals held that these stops violated the Fourth 
Amendment, concluding that a stop for inquiry is con-
stitutional only if the Border Patrol reasonably suspects 
the presence of illegal aliens on the basis of articulable 
facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's conviction , and af-
firmed the orders to suppress in the other cases. 514 
F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand. 
4 The prosecution of Martinrz-Fuerte was before a different dis-
trict judge than were the other cases. 
5 1118 principal question before the Court of AppeaJs was the 
com;titutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under 
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were 
stopped. See n. -, infra. The Government, ho·wcver, preserved 
tho question of whether routine checkpoint Htops could be made 
ab::;ent a warrant. 
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B 
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar-
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U.S. 
Highwa.y 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates 
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways 
running north frmn the lower Rio Grande valley. The 
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Browns-
ville, and 65-00 miles from the nearest point of the 
M-exican border. The physical arrangement of the 
checkpoint resembles generally that of the San Clemente 
checkpoint, but t IS operated Ifferently in 
that the officers customarily stop a.ll northbound motor-
ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers 
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are wa.ved V"' through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the 
()J -......._ ~n_Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was con-
c::r-- ducted ~judicial warrant. 
:. '· 
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any 
visible passengers. .When an agent approached his ve-
hicle, however, he observed four passengers in the ve-
hicle, one in the front seat and the other three in the 
rea~ slumped down in the seats. Question-
ii1g revealed that each passenger was an illegal alien, a.l-
though Sifuentes was a United States citizen. The 
aliens had met Sifuentes in the United States, by pre-
arrangement, after swimming a.cross the Rio Grande. 
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illega.Ily 
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). He 
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the 
evidence derived from the stop. The motion was de-
nied a.nd he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes 
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal, 
contending primarily that routine stops made without 
reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are 
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals 
74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION 
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for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an un-
published opinion, relying on its opinion in United States 
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 ( 1975·). There the Court 
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops a.re 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We a.fiirm.6 
II 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law 
enforcement technique considered important by those 
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn-
ing to the constitutional question, we examine the con-
text in which it arises. 
A 
It has been national policy for many years to limit 
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968, 
the a.nnual quota for immigrants from all independent 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, 
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 402. Many more ali-ens than can be accommodated 
under the quota want to live and work in the United 
States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens seek 
illegally to enter or to remain in the United States. We 
noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of il-
legal immigrants [already] in the United Stat-es vary 
widely. A conservative estimat-e in 1972 produced a 
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and 
N aturaliza.tion Service now suggests there may be as 
many as 10 or 12 million aliens in the country." United 
6 We initially granted the Go\·emment's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. -, and later granted Sifuentes' 
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the rases be argued in 
tandem. - U. S. -. Subsequently we granted the motion of 
the Solicitor General to consolidnte the cnses for oral argument. 
-U.S.-. 
74-1560 & 75-58, i-OPINION 
~ UNITED STATER v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975) 
(footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85o/o of the 
illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by Lhe fact 
that economic opportunities arc significantly greater in 
the United States than they are in Mexico. United 
States v. Baca, supra, at 402. 
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico 
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin-
cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. !d. , at 
405. The United States shares a land border with Mex-
ico that is almost 2.000 miles long, and much of the 
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated 
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains per-
sonnel, -electronic equipment, and fences along portions 
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals 
to enter the United States without detection. It is also 
possible for an alien to enter unla\~ly ·at a port of 
entry by ·the use of falsified pa.pers or to enter lawfully 
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain 
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country, 
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employ-
ment is believed to be available. frequently reJ*k:~6"tr.,__-< 
... .--J.,ng with friends or professional smugglers who transport 
them in private vehicles. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 879. 
As we have noted previously, the Border Patrol con-
ducts three kinds of inland traffic-checking opera.tions 
m an effort to']~~·event illegal inm1igration. Permanent 
checkpoints, su~h as those at San Clemente and Sarita, 
ar-e maintained at or near intersections of important 
roads leading away from the border. They operate on 
7 The latter occurs particularly where '·border passcl:is " are isr>ued 
io simplify pa,:sage bctmc>en interrrlated intrmational rommunilies 
along the border. The.~e pa ·se;; authorize travel within 25 miles 
or the border for a 72-hour ]lcriod. Sec 8 CFR § 212.6 ( 1975) . 
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a coordinated basis designed to avoid circumvention by 
smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens. 
Temporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent 
ones, occasionally arc established in other stra.tegic loca-
tions. Finally, roving patrols are maintained to cover 
more isolated areas. See Alme1:da-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973).8 In fiscal 1973, 175,-
511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the 
Nation by "line watch" agents sta,tioned at the border 
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior ap-
prehended 55,300 more deportable aliens.9 Most of the· 
traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, 
though precise figures are not available. United States 
v. Baca, supra, at 407. 
B 
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, 
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anum-
ber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to as-
sure effectiv<'ness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant 
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic 
in populated areas nBar the border, (ii) close to the 
confluence of two or more significant roads leading a.way 
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts 
8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statut·ory author-
izations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrognte those be-
liOircd to be aliens as to their ri~ht to be in the United States and 
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1357 (a) ( 1), (a.) (3). 
Under current regulations this authority may be exercised anY'vhere· 
within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR §287.1(a) (1975). 
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable" means "a 
person who has been fotmd to be deportable by an immigration 
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official 
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal. 
1973). Most illegal aliens arc simply deported without prosecution. 
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-
gler::;, many of whom arc lawfully in tho United States. 
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vehicle passage around the checkpoint,. (iv) on a 
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and 
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes," 
see n. 5, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 406. 
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete 
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint. 
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint each 
year, although it actually is in operation only about 70% 
of the time.t0 In calendar year 1973, 17,000 aliens were 
apprehended there. During a.n eight-day period in 1974 
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint 
during 124Vu hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles 
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where 
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered 
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar ~ 
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would h~ve .~  
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although
Government contends that many more illegal aliens pass 
through the San Clemente checkpoint undetected. The 
record in No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable sta-
tistical information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. It 
may be assumed that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended 
there but that fewer pass by undetected, as every motor-
ist is questioned. 
III 
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and 
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppres-
sive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals. See United States 
10 The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of 
the time. "Down" periods are cau~ed by personnel shortages, 
wea.thcr conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads. 
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v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 528, 530-531 (1967). In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the 
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth 
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, .mpra, at 
20-21, a process evident in our previous cases dealing 
with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations. 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the ques-
tion was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally 
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it 
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized 
that important law enforcement interests were at stake 
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so sig-
nificantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that 
a search could be conducted only if there was probable 
cause to believe that a car contained illegal aliens, at 
least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing 
random searches by roving patrons in a given area. 
Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., 
concurring), a.nd id., at. 288-289 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same 
limitations applied to veh~cle searches conducted at a 
permanent checkpoint. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, 
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve 
a different balance of public and private interests and 
apropriately are subject to Jess stringent constitutional 
safeguards. The question was whether a roving patrol 
could stop motorists for inquiry into their residence 
status simply because they were in the general area of 
the border. We found that the interference with Fourth 
Amendment rights involved in such a stop was "modest," 
id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law en-
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forcement needs. We therefore held that an inquiry stop 
need not be justified by probable cause and may be un-
dertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of specific ar-
ticulable facts, together with the rational inferences from 
those facts, that reasonably warrant the suspicion" that a 
vehicle contains illegal aliens." I d., at 884.11 
IV 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defend-
ants contend primarily that the random stopping of ve-
hicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing stops in the absence of rea-
sonable suspicion. Sifuentes alternatively contends in 
No. 75-5387 that checkpoint stops in the absence of such 
suspicion are permissible only when the practice has the 
advance judicial authorization of a warrant. There was 
a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but 
none at Sarita. As we reach the issue of a warrant re-
quirement only if reasonable suspicion is not required, 
we turn first to whether checkpoint officers must be aware 
of articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion as a 
prerequisite to a valid stop. 
A 
Our previous cases have recognized that maintena.nce 
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary 
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled 
eff-ectively at the Border. We note here only the 
substantiality of the public interest in the particular prac-
tice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent check-
points, which the Government identifies as the most im-
portant of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the 
ll On the facts of the caile, we concluded that the stop was im-
permissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking. 
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United States 19-20.12 These checkpoints a.re located 
on important north-south highways; in their absence 
such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe 
route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries 
apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who suc-
cumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect. 
of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient high-
ways tha,t are less heavily travelled, slowing their move-
ment and making them more vulnerable to detection by 
roving patrols. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, a.t 883-885. 
The Government argues persuasively that routine 
checkpoint stops are the most effective means of moni-
toring the major routes inland. A requirement that 
stops at such checkpoints be based on individualized 
. / suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic 
_y---.__ on these highways tends to be too heavy to allow the 
L~, · 9.~ study of a given car that would allow it 
~ to be identified as possibly carrying illegal aliens. Such 
a requirement also would largely eliminate a.ny deterrent 
to the conduct of well disguised smuggling operations. 
u The defendants argue at length that the public interest in 
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Govern-
ment because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced other 
/ than by chec.kpoint opern.iions. As one a!t,ernative they suggest 
V _ the passage of legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of 
~~~ t he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-
/ / a lead ~ to e raiSing o msupera-
--- V tJ!. blo barriers against virtually all sea.rch and seizure powers. In any 
c ~ - event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that 
a.ll traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a promise our 
previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest f . . 
that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints 
could be met without reliance on causeless stops. Compare United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883 (effectiveness of roving 
patrols not defeated by reasonable suspicion requirement), with 
infra, at 18. 
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B 
While the need to make random checkpoint stops is 
great, their intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is 
quite limited. The stop does intrude on motorists' right 
to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925), a.nd arguably on their 
right to personal security. But it involves only a brief 
detention of travelers during which 
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle occupants is 
a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a. right to 
be in the United States.' " United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, supra, a.t 880. 
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
be seen without a seaJ·ch. We view such a checkpoint 
stop in a different light from a roving-patrol stop. The 
objective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, and 
the visual inspection-is equally limited in each case. 
But the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern 
or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreci-
ably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we 
noted that 
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and sea.rch are far less intrusive than those attend-
ing a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often 
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their 
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic check-
points the motorists can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' 
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened 
or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at 
894-895. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
! 
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ment analysis in this context also must take into account 
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. 
422 U. 8., at 882. We concluded there that random 
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they 
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to 
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the 
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers . . . . [They] could stop motorists at random for 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street,, a busy high-
way, or a desert road .. .. " /d., at 882-883. There also . / 
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion ~ ~ 
would be abused by th€ officer~ tlie field. Ibid. / 
Routine checkpoint stops do I v intrude similarly ------ s V 
on the motormg pu IC. 
ence with legitimate traffic otons 
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the 
checkpoints. The regularized manner in which estab-
lished checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, re-
assuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are 
duly authorized and believed to serve the public inter-
est. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen 
by officers in the field , but by officials responsible for 
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca-
tion of limited enforcement resources. We ma.y assume 
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint. 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as. 
a class.. Moreover1 while the choice of a checkpoint 
location must be left largely to the discretion of these 
officials, the reasonableness of a given location is subject 
to judicial review. 
The defendants arrested a.t the San Clemente check-
point suggest that its operation involves a, significant 
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ber of ca.rs are referred to the secondary inspection area. 
We do not agree. Referrals are made for the sole pur-
pose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into 
r·esidence status that caJmot feasibly be made of every 
motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective in-
trusion of the stop and inquiry thus remains minimal. 
Selective referral may involve some subjective intrusive-
ness, but it remains true that the stops should not be 
frightening or offensive because of their public and 
relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective refer-
rals-rather tha.n questioning the occupants of every 
car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests 
by minimi:r,ing the intrusion on the general motoring 
public. 
c 
The defendants note correctly tha.t some quantum of 
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a 
constitutional search or seizure.13 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523 (1967). See ~1so Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
supra, a.t 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288-
' 3 Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, 
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce la.ws rega.rding 
drivers' licf'nses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar 
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be 
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusive-
ness on one's right to travel, HJJd the logic of the defendants' posi-
tion, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials 
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As 
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them 
other than to note that 1ifte practiCe of stopping automobiles briefly 
for questioning as a ong istory cyj encing 1ts 
ublity and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use . 
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289 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Collonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 
supra, at 154. In Camara the Court required an "area 
warrant" to support the reasonableness of inspecting 
private residences for building code violations within a 
particular area, but expressly recognized that neither 
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion was required to 
enter any particular residence. In so holding, the Court 
examined the governmental interest advanced to justify 
a rec~ized "intrusion upon the constitutionally pro-
tected interest of the private citizen," id., at 535, and 
concluded that under the circumstances such interest 
outweighed that of the private citizens. 
In this case we are concerned neither with searches 
nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily 
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S .. 
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its 
operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacyf in one'~denc~ Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48 (1970); U. S. v. Ortiz, supra, 
at 896 n. 2. The purpose of the stops by the Border 
Patrol in the cases before us is legitimate and in the 
public interest:14 We also think the circumstances under 
which the stops were made and the procedures followed 
reasonably further the governmental purpose with a 
minimum intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests. 
Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at 
14 The public and private interests discussed here have been 
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note, 
Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Per-
son, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Search Warrants in 
Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 Yale L. J. 355-
(1974). 
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issue may be made in the absence of any individualized 
suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints.15 
We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
15 As a judicial wa.rrant authorized the Border Patrol to make 
routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal ques-
tion addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circui~ 
whether routine checkpoint stop8 were constitutional when author-
ized by warrant. Cf. n. 1, supra. The Court of Appeals hcld 
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 
F. 2d, at 318, and that, it was unreasonable to issue a warrant, 
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. !d., at 
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens 
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the dist.cwce of 
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interferrnce with 
legitillk'tte traffic. Ibid. We need not address thrE"e holdings spe-
cifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem 
the latter holding and the reliance upon it by the defendants in 
No. 74-1560 to raise the question whether, even though a wa.rrant 
is not required, it is unren~onable to locate a checkpoint at San 
Clemente. ----
(:5 .'!t We ave malca. 1riffla.Qy that the choice of checkpoint~ -
tions is an administrative deci~ion that must b.c left largely within 
1 
. ., the discretion of the Border Pa.t rol, srr supra, nt 21; cf. Camam 
$ tvtJ v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967) . .-a.»ft--mrltn-e~~ 
question _ttbout the rca~onableness of loeating a chrckpoint at San 
emente. The principal focus should be on whrther the checkpoint 
reasonably ndvanees the law enforcement need;: tha,t m:1 kP check-
points constitution::~lly permissible. There ran be little doubt t.hat 
the San Clemente checkpoint docs in light. of the high ah~<olute 
number of apprchcnflions and the predictability that significant 
numbers of illegal aliens will u.~e Interstate 5. Moroovcr, the 
Border Patrol has located the checkpoint where San Diego-to-Los 
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with 
legi't-Unate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the rr.asonablcness of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
J ' 
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it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the 
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry,' 6 we perceive no 
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi-
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist 
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol 
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor-
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.17 
v 
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that random stops 
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has 
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint 
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant 
16 The record in No. 74-1560 does not necessarily support the 
contention that referrals are based ~oldy on apparent Mexican 
ancestry, as less than 1% of the motorists are stopped and the 
defendants themselves note that American citizens of Mexican 
ancestry and legally resident Mexican citizens constitute a large 
proportion of the popula.tion of Southern California. Brief for 
Respondents 42. Moreover, the Government has informed us tha.t 
trained Border Patrol agents rely on factors in addition to ~~pparent 
Mexican ancestry when selectively stopping motorists. Brief for 
the United States in No. 75-5387, -. See Brignoni-Ponce, sup1·a, 
at 884-885. 
u Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area. 
during the days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 20% contained illegal n.Jiens. Supra, at 13. In the~e cir-
cumstances, any reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry, see n. 9, 
supra, clearly was relevant to the law enforcement need to be served. 
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 887, where we noted 
that "[t]he likelihood that any ~ivcn person of Mexican ancestry 
is an alien is high enough to make Mexiean appea.mnce a relevant 
factor . . . ," although we held thnt :-~pparent Mexican ancestry 
by itself could not create the reasonable suRpicion for u roving-
patrol stop. Id., at 885-886. Different considerations would arise 
if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry 
at a eheckpoint operated ncar the Canadian border. 
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requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that an "area" war-
rant was required to conduct a building code inspection, 
even though there was no cause to believe that there 
were violations in any pa.rticular building.18 
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt 
model. It involved the search of private residences, for 
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See, 
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the Fourth Amendment interests that 
normally justify the warrant requirement are absent 
here. The degree of intrusion upon privacy that may 
be occasioned by a search of a house hardly can be com-
pared with the minor interference with privacy resulting 
from the mere stop for questioning as to citizenship. 
Moreover, other supportive purposes served by the re-
quirement of a warrant are inapplicable. One such pur-
pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United 
States v. Watson, - U. S. -, - n. 22 (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops, 
however, turns on the location and method of operation 
of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the 
distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to 
post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a war-
rant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to 
substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of 
18 There a.!Ro is some support for a warrant requirement in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez, sup:ra, which 
commanded the votes of five Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowE.LL, 
J., ooncurring); id., at 288-289 (WHI'I'E, J., dissenting). The bur-
den o.f these opinions, however, was that an "area" warrant could 
serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search 
that otherwise was necessary to sustain the roving-patrol searches. 
As particularized suspicion is not necessary here, the warrant func-
tion discussed in Almeida-Sanchez is not an issue in these cases. 
.; 
.I.!' 
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the searching or seizing offices, United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-318 (1972), but 
the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize" 
is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field. 
The warrant requirement in Camara served Fourth 
Amendment interests to whi.ch a warrant requirement 
here would make little contribution. The Court there 
said: 
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] de-
mands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code in-
volved requires inspection of his premises, no way 
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion." 387 U. S., at 532. 
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these 
scores, but we believe that the visible manifestations of 
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances in this case. 
VI 
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning 
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
thorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim-
itations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 
supra, at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 
at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint searches are 
constitutional only if justified by consent or probable 
cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. And our 
holding today is limited to the type of stops described in 
this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ... must be 
based on consent or probable cause." United States v. 
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Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 881-882. None of the defend-
ants in these cases argues that the stopping officers ex-
ceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. Were-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the 
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other 
cases to the District Court for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
.. 
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of certa.in evidence on the ground that the operation of 
the checkpoint was incompa.tible with the Fourth 
Amendment. In each insta.nce whether the Fourth 
Amendment was viola.ted turns prima.rily on whether 
a vehicle may be stopped a.t a fixed checkpoint for brief 
questioning of its occupants even though there is no 
rea.son to believe the pa.rticula.r vehicle, conta.ins illegal 
a.liens. We reserved this question la.st Term in United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold 
today tha.t such stops a.re consistent with the Fourth 
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a judicial warra.nt. 
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I 
A 
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in 
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made 
in three different occasions at the permanent immigra-
tion checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. 
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego 
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is 
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. W c pre-
viously have had occasion to describe the checkpoint as 
follows: 
" 'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, 
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a 
mile further north are two black on yellow signs 
suspended over the highway with flashing lights 
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the 
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of 
California weighing station, are two large signs with 
flashing red lights suspended over the highway. 
These signs each state "STOP HERE-D. S. OF-
FICERS." Placed on the highway arc a number 
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes 
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, 
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks 
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes arc offi-
cial U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition , there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary 
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for 
nighttime operation.'" United States v. Ortiz, 
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Supp. 398, 410-411 (ED Cal. 1973). 
\ 
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The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of 
traffic screens visually all northbound vehicles, which the 
checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, stop.1 
Most motorists are allowed .to resume their progress with-
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a 
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will 
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs 
such cars tO' a secondary inspection area, where its occu-
pants are asked about their citizenship and immigration 
status. The Government informs us that at San Cle-
mente the average length of an investigation in the sec-
ondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief 
for Government 53. A direction to stop in the secondary 
inspection area could be based on something suspicious 
about a particular car passing through the checkpoint, 
but the Government concedes that none of the three 
stops at issue in No. 74-1560 were based on any articu-
lable suspicion. During the period when these stops 
were made, the San Clemente checkpoint was operating 
under a magistra.te's "warrant of inspection," which au-
thorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop 
operation at the San Clemente location.2 
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved 
in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the case. 
Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached the San 
1 The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the 
secondary inspection urea arc brought to a. complete halt or merely 
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Rcsolution of this dii3pute 
is not necessary here, as we may assume, w·guendo, that, all motor-
ist~ passing through the checkpoint arc so slowed as to have been 
"seized." 
2 The "warrant of inspection" was sought because the COurt of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit already had held that random check-
point stops could not be made nbsent such a warra.nt. See United 
States v. Esquer-Rivem, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974). See also n. -,. 
infra. 
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Clemente checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two 
female passengers. The women were illegal Mexican 
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro 
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused 
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego, to be transported 
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to 
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro-
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident 
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the 
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts 
of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. 
~ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evi-
dence obtained at the checkpoint on the ground that its 
operation was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 
The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted 
on both counts after a jury trial. 
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass 
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing 
a passenger who had been smuggled across the border a.t 
San Ysidro and picked up for transportation by pre-
arrangement. Questioning at the checkpoint revealed 
the illegal status of the passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia 
was charged in two counts with illegally transporting an 
alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). and conspiring to commit 
that offense. 18 U. S. C. § 371. His motion to suppress 
the evidence derived from the stop was granted. 
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Farnando Me-
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen 
3 Each of the defendants in No. 74--1560 and the defendant in 
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony 
of one or more illegal alieni'. We noted in United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876. n. 2 (1975), that "[t]hcre may be 
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at. trial, 
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized 
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . ." The 
question again is not before us. 
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driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passen-
gers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area re-
vealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal 
aliens. A subsequent sea.rch of the car uncovered three 
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan 
had led the other aliens across the border at the beach 
near Tijuana., Mexico, where they rendezvoused with a 
United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan 
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans-
porting aliens, 8 U.S. C. §1324(a)(2), four counts of · 
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4), 
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress. 
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the 
Government appealed the granting of the motions to 
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jininez-Garcia 
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan! The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three 
appeals, which presented the common question whether · 
the routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment:5 The Court . 
of Appeals held that these stops violated the Fourth 
Amendment, concluding that a stop for inquiry is con-
stitutional only if the Border Patrol reasonably suspects 
the presence of illegal aliens on the basis of articulable 
facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's conviction, and af-
firmed the orders to suppress in the other cases. 514 
F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand. 
1 The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different dis-
trict judge than were the other cases. 
5 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the 
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under 
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were 
stopped. See n. -, infra. The Government, however, preserved 
the question of whether routine checkpoint stops could be made 
absent a warrant. 
' .. 
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Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar-
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S. 
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates 
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways 
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The 
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Browns-
ville, and 65- 90 miles from the nearest point . of the 
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the 
checkpoint resembles generally that of the San Clemente 
checkpoint, but the checkpoint is operated differently in 
that the officers customarily stop ail northbound motor-
ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers 
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved 
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the 
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was con-
ducted without any judicial warrant. 
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any 
visible passengers. When an agent approached his ve-
hicle, however, he observed four passengers in the ve-
hicle, one in the front seat and the other three in the 
rear, who were slumped down in the seats. Question-
ing revealed that each passenger was an illegal alien, al-
though Sifuentes was a United States citizen. The 
aliens had met Sifuentes in the United States, by pre-
arrangement, after swimming across the Rio Grande. 
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally 
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). He 
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the 
evidence derived from the stop. The motion was de-
nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes 
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal, 
contending primarily that routine stops made without 
reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are 
unconstitutionaL The United Sta.tes Court of Appeais 
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for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an un-
published opinion, relying on its opinion in United States 
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court 
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.~ 
II 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits are in conflict qn the constitutionality of a law 
enforcement technique considered important by those 
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn-
ing to the constitutional question, we examine the con-
text in which it arises. 
A 
It has been national policy for many years to limit 
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968, 
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, 
ha.s been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, supra,. 
at 402. Many more ali€ns than can be accommodated 
under the quota want to live and work in the United 
States. Consequently, large numbers of aJiens seek 
illegally to enrer or to rema.in in the United States. We 
noted la.st Term tha.t "[e]stimates of the number of il-
legal immigrants [already] in the Unired Stares vary 
widely. A conservative estima.re in 1972 produced a 
figure of about one million, 'but the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as 
many as 10 or 12 million aliens in the country." United 
6 We initially granted tho Govern~ent's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U.S.-, and later granted· Sifuentes' 
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the ca.·es be argued in 
tandem. - U. S. -. Subsequently we granted the motion of 
the Solicitor General to consolirbto the eases for oral argument. 
-U.S.-. 
t' \. ~·· 
74-1560 & 75--5387-0PINION 
8 UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975) 
(footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85,o/o of the 
illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the fact 
that economic opportunities are significantly greater in 
the United States than they are in Mexico. United 
States v. Baca, s·upra, at 402. 
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico 
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin-
cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at 
405. The United States shares a land border with Mex-
ico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the 
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated 
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains per-
sonnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions 
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals 
to enter the United States without detection. It is also 
possible for an alien to enter unlawuflly at a port of 
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully 
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain 
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country, 
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employ-
ment is believed to be available, frequently rendezvous-
ing with friends or professional smugglers who transport 
them in private vehicles. United States v. B1-ignoni-
Pance, supra, at 879. 
As we have noted previously, the Border Patrol eon-
ducts three kinds of inla.nd traffic-checking operations 
in an effort to prevent illegal immigration. Permanent 
checkpoints, such as those at San Clemente and Sarita, 
are maintained at or near intersections of important 
roads leading away from the border. They operate on 
7 The latter occurs particuhrly where "border passess" are issued 
to simplify passage between interrelated international communities 
along the border. These passes authorize travel within 25 miles 
of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.6 ( 1975). 
,. 
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a coordinated basis designed to avoid circumvention by 
smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens. 
Temporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent 
ones, occasionally are established in other strategic loca-
tions. Finally, roving pa.trols are maintained to cover 
more isolated areas. See Alrneida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973).8 In fiscal 1973, 175,-
511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the 
Nation by "line watch" a.gents stationed at the border 
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior ap-
prehended 55,300 more deportable aliens.9 Most of the 
traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, 
though precise figures m·e not available. United States 
v. Baca, supra, at 407. 
B 
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, 
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anum-
ber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to as-
sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant 
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic 
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the 
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away 
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts 
8 All these opera.tions are conducted pursuant to statuimy author-
izations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those be-
lieved to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and 
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U.S. C. §§1357(a)( 1) , (a.)(3). 
Under current regulations this authority may be exercised anywhere 
within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR § 287.1(a) (1975). 
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable" means "a 
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration 
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official 
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD CaL 
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution. 
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-
glers, many of whom are lawfully in the United Sta.tes. 
~ ....... _ 
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vehicle passage around the checkpoint,. (iv) on a 
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and 
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes," 
see n. 5, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 406. 
The record in No. 74--1560 provides a rather complete 
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint. 
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint each 
year, although it actually is in operation only about 705-"o 
of the time.10 In calendar year 1973, 17,000 aliens were 
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974 
that included the arrests involved in No. 74--1560, 
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint 
during 124Yu hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles 
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where 
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered 
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar 
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have · 
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, althought the 
Government contends that many more illegal aliens pass 
through the San Clemente checkpoint undetected. The 
record in No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable sta-
tistical information rega.rding the Sarita checkpoint. It 
may be assumed that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended 
there but that fewer pass by undetected, as every motor-
ist is questioned. 
III 
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and 
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppres-
sive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals. See United States 
10 The Sarita eheckpoint. is operated a. compnmble proportion of 
the time. "Down" periods nrc rauRcd by personnel shortages, 
wea.thcr conditionR, and-at San Clemento-peak traffic Joadg. 
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v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 
1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 528, 530-531 ( 1967). In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the 
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth 
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 
20-21, a process evident in our previous cases dealing 
with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations. 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the ques-
tion was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally 
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it 
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized 
that important law enforcement interests were at stake 
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so sig-
nificantly on Fourth Amendment priva.cy interests that 
a search could be conducted only if there was probable 
cause to believe that a car contained illegal aliens, at 
least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing 
random searches by roving patrons in a given area. 
Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283--285 (PowELL, J., 
concurring) , and id., at 288-289 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same 
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a 
permanent checkpoint. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, 
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve 
a different balance of public and private interests and 
apropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional 
safeguards. The question was whether a roving patrol 
could stop motorists for inquiry into their residence 
status simply because they were in the general area of 
the border. We found that the interference with Fourth 
Amendment rights involved in such a stop was "modest," 
id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law en-
~. 
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forcement needs. We therefore held that an inquiry stop 
need not be justified by probable cause and may be un-
dertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of specific ar-
ticulable facts, together with the rational inferences from 
those facts, that reasonably warrant the suspicion" that a 
vehicle contains illegal aliens." !d., at 884.1 ' 
IV 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defend-
ants contend primarily that the random stopping of ve-
hicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignon'i-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing stops in the absence of rea-
sonable suspicion. Sifuentes alternatively contends in 
No. 75-5387 that checkpoint stops in the absence of such 
suspicion are permissible only when the practice has the 
advance judicial authorization of a warrant. There wa.s 
a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but 
none at Sarita. As we reach the issue of a warrant re-
quirement only if reasonable suspicion is not required, 
we turn first to whether checkpoint officers must be aware 
of articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion as a 
prerequisite to a valid stop. 
A 
Our previous cases have recogniz.ed that maintena.nce 
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary 
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled 
effectively at the Border. We note here only the 
substantiality of the public interest in the particular prac-
tice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent check-
points, which the Government identifies a.s the most im-
portant of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the 
11 On the facts of the rase, "·c concluded that the stop was im-
permissible because rcnsonDblc ~:>u ~picion was lacking. 
·, 
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United States 19- 20. '2 These checkpoints are located 
on important north-south highways; in their absence 
such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick a.nd safe 
route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries 
apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who suc-
cumb to the lure of such higlnvays. And the prospect 
of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient high-
ways that are less heavily travelled, slowing their move-
ment and making them more vulnerable to detection by 
roving patrols. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 883-885. 
The Government argues persuasively that routine 
checkpoint stops are the most effective means of moni-
toring the major routes inland. A requirement that 
stops at such checkpoints be based on individualized 
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic 
on these highways tends to be too heavy to allow the 
individualized study of a given car that would allow it 
to be identified as possibly carrying illegal aliens. Such 
a requirement also would largely eliminate any deterrent 
to the conduct of well disguised smuggling operations. 
12 The defendants argue at length that the public interest in 
maintaining checkpoints is Jess than is asserted by the Govern-
ment because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced other 
than by checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest 
the passage of legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of 
illegal aliens. We believe tho logic of such elaborate leRs-restrict ive-
a.lternative arguments wonld lefld quickly to the raisi1~g of insupera-
ble barriers against virtually all se-arch and seizure powers. In any 
event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that 
all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our 
previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest forcefully 
that tho particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints 
could be met without reliance on causeless stops. Compare United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883 (effectiveness of roving 
patrols not defeated by reasonable suspicion requirement), with 
infra, at 18. 
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B 
·While the need to make random checkpoint stops is 
great, their intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is 
quite limited. The stop does intrude on motorists' right 
to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925), and a.rguahly on their 
right to personal security. But it involves only a brief 
detention of travelers during which 
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle occupants is 
a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a right to 
be in the United States.'" United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, supra, at 880. 
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
be seen without a search. We view such a checkpoint 
stop in a different light from a roving-patrol stop. The 
objective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, a.nd 
the visual inspection-is equally limited in each case. 
But the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern 
or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreci-
ably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we 
noted that 
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than those attend-
ing a roving-patrol stop. Roving pa,trols often 
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, a.nd their 
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic check-
points the motorists can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' 
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened 
or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at 
894-895. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
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ment analysis in this context also must take into account 
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. 
422 U. S., at 882. We concluded there that random 
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they 
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to 
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the 
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers . . . . [They] could stop motorists at random for 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy high-
way, or a desert road .... " !d., at 882-883. There also 
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion 
would be abused by the officer in the field. Ibid. 
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly 
on the motoring public. First. the potential interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic is quite limited. Motorists 
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the 
checkpoints. The regularized manner in which estab-
lished checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, re-
assuring to law-abiding motorists. that the stops are 
duly authorized and believed to serve the public inter-
est. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen 
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for 
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca,... 
tion of limited enforcement resources. We may assume 
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as 
a class. Moreover, while the choice of a checkpoint 
location must be left largely to the discretion of these 
officials, the reasonableness of a given location is subject 
to judicial review. 
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente check-
point suggest that its operation involves a significant 
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small num-
..... . 
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ber of cars are referred to the secondary inspection area. 
We do not agree. Referrals a.re made for the sole pur-
pose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into 
r·esidence status that cannot feasibly be made of every 
motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective in-
trusion of the stop and inquiry thus rema.ins minimaL 
Selective referral may involve some subjective intrusive-
ness, but it remains true that the stops should not be 
frightening or offensive because of their public and 
relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective refer-
rals-rather than questioning the occupants of every 
car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests 
by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring 
public. 
c 
The defendants note correctly that some quantum of 
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a 
constitutional search or seizure.13 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 
This is clear from Camara v. M'unicipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288-
13 Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, 
are used widely at state and locnl levels to enforce laws regnrding 
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and ;;imilar 
!Ik'Ltters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be 
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusive-
ness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' posi-
tion, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement. officials 
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As 
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them 
other than to note that the practice of stopping automobiles briefly 
for questioning on such matters has a long history evidencing its 
utility and is accepted by motorists ·as incident to highway usc . 
.• 
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289 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Collonnade Catering Corp .. 
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v .. 
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 
supra, at 154. In Camara the Court required an "area 
warrant" to support the reasonableness of inspecting 
private residences for building code violations within a 
particular area, but expressly recognized that neither 
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion was required to 
enter any particular residence. In so holding, the Court 
examined the governmental interest advanced to justify 
a recongized "intrusion upon the constitutionally pro-
tected interest of the private citizen," id., at 535. and 
concluded that under the circumstances such interest 
outweighed that of the private citizens. 
In this case we are concerned neither with searches 
nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily 
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S .. 
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its 
operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy in one's residence. Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48 (1970); U. S. v. Ortiz, supra, 
at 896 n. 2. The purpose of the stops by the Border 
Patrol in the cases before us is legitimate and in the 
public interest.14 We also think the circumstances under 
which the stops were made and the procedures followed 
reasonably further the governmental purpose with a 
minimum intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests. 
Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at 
14 The public a.nd private interes ts cliscussed here have been 
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note, 
Nonarrest Automobile Stops : Unconstitutional Seizures of the Per-
son, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Search Warrants in 
Border Zones : Almeida-SaJJchez and Camara, 84 Ya.le 1 . J. 355 
(1974). 
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issue may be made in the absence of any individualized 
suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints?" 
We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
15 As a judicial wa.rrant authorized the Border Patrol to make 
routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal ques-
tion addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when author-
ized by warrant. Cf. n. 1, supra. The Court of Appeals held 
alternatively that a. warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a. wa.rra.nt 
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Id. , at 
321-322. In reaching the latter conelusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on (i) "the flow] frequency with which illegal aliens 
pa::;s through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of 
tho checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with 
legitimate traffic. Ibid . We need not address thf'se holdings spe-
cifica.lly, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem 
the la.tter holding and the reliance upon it by the defendants in 
No. 74-1560 to raise the question whether, even though a warrant 
is not required, it is unreasonable to loca.te a checkpoint at San 
Clemente. 
We have indicated already thnt the choice of checJ,point loca-
tions is an administrative deci~ion that must be left largely within 
the discretion of the Border Pntrol, ~ee supra, nt 21; cf. Camm·a 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967), and we have ll(} 
question about the reasonnblene~s ·of locating a checkpoint at S11n 
Clemente. The principal focus should be on whether the checkpoint 
renl'onnbly ndv:mres the law enforcement needs that mnke C'hf'rk-
points constitutionally permissible. There cnn be little doubt that 
the San Clemente l'hcckpoint does in light of the high absolute 
number of a.pprehensionfi nnd the predictability that significant 
numbers of illegal aliens will use Inter~tate 5. Moreover, the 
Border Patrol has ]orated the checkpoint where Snn Diego-to-L<>s 
Angeles trnffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with 
legitimate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the rea r;onnblene8s of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
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it be assumed that such referrals are ma.de largely on the 
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry,t6 we perceive no 
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi-
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist 
to justify it, we think it follo,vs that the Border Patrol 
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor-
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.17 
v 
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that random stops 
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has 
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint 
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant 
16 The rerord in No. 74-1560 does not necessarily support the 
contention that referrals are based solely on apparent Mexican 
ancestry, as less than 1% of the motori~ts are stopped and the 
defendants themselves note that American citizens of Mexica.n 
ancestry and legally re. ident Mrxican citizens constitute a la,rge 
proportion of the populn.tion of Southern California.. Brief for 
Respondents 42. Moreover, the Government has informed us that 
trained Border Patrol agents rely on factors in addition to apparent 
Mexican ancestry when selectively stopping motorists. Brief for 
the United States in No. 75--5387, -. See Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 
at 884-885. 
H Of the 820 vehicles referred to the seconcla.ry inspect ion a.rea 
during the days surrounding the arre~:>ts involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 20% conta.ined illegnl aliens. S1~pra, at 13. In these cir-
cumstances, any reliance on apparent Mexican nncoRtry, see 11. 9, 
supra, clearly was relevant to the law enforcement need to be served. 
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 887, where we noted· 
that "[t]he likelihood thnt nny given perRon of Mexican ancestry 
is an alien is high enough to make Mexiean appearance a relevant 
factor ... ," although we hold that apparent Mexican ancestry 
by itself could not create tho reasonable suspicion for a roving-
patrol stop. ld., at 885--886. Different considerations would arise 
if, for example, reliance were put 011 apparent Mexican ancestry 
at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border. 
'·' 
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requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that an "area" war-
rant was required to conduct a building code inspection, 
even though there was no cause to believe that there 
were violations in any particular building.18 
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt 
model. It involved the search of private residences, for 
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See, 
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the Fourth Amendment interests that 
normally justify the warrant requirement are absent 
here. The degree of intrusion upon privacy that may 
be occasioned by a search of a house ha.rdly can be com-
pared with the minor interference with privacy resulting 
from the mere stop for questioning as to citi%enship. 
Moreover, other supportive purposes served by the re-
quirement of a warrant are inapplicable. One such pur-
pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United 
States v. Watson , - U. S. -, - n. 22 (MARSHALL, 
J. , dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops, 
however, turns on the location and method of operation 
of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the 
distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to 
post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a war-
rant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to 
substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of 
18 There also is some support for a warrant rcquirrmcnt in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez, supra, which 
commanded the votes of five Justices. Sec id., at 283-285 (PowE.LL,. 
J ., concurring); id., at 288-289 (WRITE, J., dissenting). The bur-
den of these opinions, however, was that an "area" warr::mt could 
serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search 
that otherwise was necessary t,o sustain the roving-patrol searches. 
As particularized suspicion is not necessary here, the warrant func-
tion discussed in Almeida-Sanchez is not an isstle in these cases. 
... 
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the searching or seizing offices, United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 316-318 ( 1972), but 
the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize" 
is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field. 
The warrant requirement in Camara served Fourth 
Amendment interests to which a warrant requirement 
here would make little contribution. The Court there 
said: 
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] de-
mands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code in-
volved requires inspection of his premises, no way 
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion." 387 U.S., at 532. 
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these 
scores, but we believe that the visible manifestations of 
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances in this case. 
VI 
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning 
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
thorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim-
itations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 
supra, at 24.-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 
at 881- 882. We have held that checkpoint searches are 
constitutional only if justified by consent or probable 
cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. And our 
holding today is limited to the type of stops described in 
this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ... must be 
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Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 881-882. None of the defend-
ants in these cases argues that the stopping officers ex-
ceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. Were-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the 
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other 
cases to the District Court for further proceedings. 
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses 
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. 
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint 
operated by the Border Patrol away from the interna-
tional border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion 
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of 
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth 
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth 
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether 
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief 
questioning of its occupants even though there is no 
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal 
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975) . We hold 
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a 
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by 
a judicial warrant. 
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I 
A 
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in 
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made 
on three different occasions at the permanent immigra-
tion checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. 
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego 
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is 
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We pre-
·viously have described the checkpoint as follows: 
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, 
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a 
mile further north are two black on yellow signs 
suspended over the highway with flashing lights 
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the 
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of 
California weighing station, are two large signs with 
flashing red lights suspended over the highway. 
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OF-
FICERS." Placed on the highway are a number 
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes 
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, 
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks 
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are offi-
cial U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary 
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for 
nighttime operation.'" United States v. Ortiz, 
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Supp. 398, 410-411 (SD Cal. 1973). 
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of 
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the 
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt.1 
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with"' 
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a 
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will 
aoncfude that further inquiry is in order. He directs 
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their oc-
cupants are asked about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status. The Government informs us that at San 
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the 
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief 
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the second-
ary inspection area could be based on something suspi-
cious about a particular car passing through the check..-
point, but the Government concedes that none of the 
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any 
articulable suspicion. During the period when these 
stops were made, the checkpoint was operating under 
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which au-
thorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop 
operation at the San Clemente location.2 
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved 
1 The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the 
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely 
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute 
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motor-
ists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been 
"seized." 
2 The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was 
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rotb 
tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without 
such a warrant . See United States v. Bowen, 500 F . 2d 960 (1974), 
aff'd, on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v. 
l!IBfJ'I>I!BF RirJetf1i498 F. 2d 7 (1974) . Soon after the warrant issued, 
the Court of Appeals held that random stops alone also could not 
·be made absent such a warrant. See United States v. Esquer~. 
Rivera, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974). SeE:; also n. 15, infra .. 
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the case. 
Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached the 
checkpoint driving a vehicle cnotaining two fe. 
male passengers. The women were illegal Mexican 
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro 
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused 
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported 
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to 
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro· 
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident 
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the 
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts 
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. 
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evi-
dence stemming from the stop on the ground that the 
operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.3 The motion to suppr·ess was de-
nied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury 
trial. 
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass 
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing 
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by pre-
arrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been 
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the second-
ary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the 
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged in two counts 
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) 
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C. 
3 Each of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in 
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony 
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted m United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]here may be 
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial, 
as opposed to a Government agent 's testimony about objects seizecf 
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression ... . " The· 
· question again is not before us. 
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived; 
from the stop was granted. 
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Me,_ 
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillffi 
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passen-
gers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area re-
vealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal 
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three 
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had 
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near· 
Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen, 
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan 
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans-
porting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of 
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., § 1324 (a)( 4), 
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-. 
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress. 
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the 
Government appealed the granting of the motions to 
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia 
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan.4 The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three 
appeals, which presented the common question whether 
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court of Ap-
peals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops 
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop 
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol 
4 The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different dis-
trict judge than were the other cases. 
5 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the 
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under 
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were 
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved 
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be madt>· 
aQsent a wa,rraE:t; .. 
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the 
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's 
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the 
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand, 
B 
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar~ 
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S. 
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates 
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways 
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. ' The 
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Browns-
ville, and 65-90 lniles from the nearest point of the 
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the 
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente, 
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that 
the officers customarily stop all northbound motor-
ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers 
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved 
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the 
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was con-
ducted without a judicial warrant. 
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any 
visible passengers. When an agent approached his ve-
hicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the 
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down 
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger 
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United 
States citizen. · The aliens had met Sifuentes in the 
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across 
the Rio Grande. 
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally 
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). He 
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the-
evidence derived from the stop. The motion was de .. 
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nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes 
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal, 
contending primarily that stops made without rea-
son to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are 
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an un-
published order, relying on its opinion in United States 
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court 
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.0 
II 
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law 
enforoement technique considered important by those 
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn-
ing to the constitutional question, we examine the con-
text in which it arises. 
A 
It has been national policy for many years to limit 
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968, 
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, 
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Supp., at 402. Many more alien.s than can be accommo-
dated under the quota want to live and work in the 
United States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens 
seek illegally to enter or to remain in the United Sta,tes. 
We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of 
illegal immigrants [already] in the United States vary 
6 We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. - , and later granted Sifuentes' 
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in 
tandem. - U. S. - . Subsequently we granted the motion of 
the Solicitor General to consolidate the cases for oral a.rgument , 
~u. s. -. 
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widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a 
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as 
many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country." 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 
(1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of 
the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the 
fact that economic opportunities are significantly greater 
in the United States than they are in Mexico. United 
States v. Baca, supra, at 402. 
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico 
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin-
cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at 
405. The United States shares a land border with Mex-
ico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the 
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated 
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains per-
sonnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions 
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals 
to enter the United States without detection. It also is 
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of 
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully 
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain 
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country, 
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employ-
ment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by 
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers 
who transport them in private vehicles. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879. 
As we have noted previously, the Border Patrol con-
7 The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued 
to simplify passage between interrelated American and Mexican 
communities along the border. These passes authorize travel within ·. 
25 miles of the. bord!)r_ for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.6 . 
(1975) •. 
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ducts three kinds of inland traffic-checking operations in 
an effort to minimize illegal immigration. Permanent 
checkpoints, such as those at San Clemente and Sarita, 
are maintained at or near intersections of important 
roads leading away from the border. They operate on 
a coordinated basis designed to avoid circumvention by 
smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens. 
Temporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent 
ones, occasionally are established in other strategic loca-
tions. Finally, roving patrols are maintained to cover 
more isolated areas. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973).8 In fiscal1973, 175,-
511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the 
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border 
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior ap-
prehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9 
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at check-
points, though precise figures are not available. United 
States v. Baca, supra, at M)5, 407 and n. 2. 
B 
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, 
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a num-
ber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to as-
8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory author-
izations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those be-
lieved to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and 
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§1357(a)(l), (a)(3). 
Under current regulations this authority may be exercised anywhere 
within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR § 287.1(a) (1975). 
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a 
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration 
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official 
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal. 
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution. 
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-
~lers, II\(\·ny qf whqm ate tawf\Jlly in the United States. 
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant 
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic 
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the 
confluence of two 6r more significant roads leading away 
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts 
vehicle passage around the checkpoint~ (iv) on a 
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and 
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes," 
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 406. 
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete 
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint. 
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint loca-
tion each year, although the checkpoint actually is in 
operation only about 70% of the time.1 0 In calendar 
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were 
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974 
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint 
during 124Vs hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles 
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where 
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered 
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar 
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have 
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the 
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass 
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in 
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical 
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. It may 
be assumed that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended 
there but that fewer pass- by undetected, as every motor-
ist is questioned. 
'lo The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of 
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages, 
weather conditions1 and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads. 
., 
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III 
"l:'he Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and 
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppres-
sive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals. See United States-
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz, 
422 U. S., at 895; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 528 (1967). In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the 
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth 
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases 
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations. 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the ques-
tion was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally 
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it 
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized 
that important law enforcement interests were at stake 
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so sig-
nificantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that 
a search could be conducted without consent only if there 
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal 
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant au-
thorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given 
area. Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283-285 (PowELL, 
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same 
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a 
permanent checkpoint. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, 
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve 
a different balance of public and private interests and· 
appropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional 
$afeguards. The question was whether a roving patrol" 
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could stop motorists for inquiry into their residence 
status simply because they were in the general area of 
the border. We found that the interference with Fourth 
Amendment interests involved in such a stop was "mod-
est," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law 
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving-
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and 
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of 
specific articulable facts, together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, that reasonably warrant sus-
picion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at 
884.11 
IV 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 11seizures" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defend-
ants contend primarily that thP random stopping of ve-
hicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends 
in No. 75-5387 that random checkpoint stops are per-
missible only when the practice has the advance judicial 
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant au-
thorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita. 
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if 
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to 
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid 
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests 
at stake. 
A 
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance 
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary 
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled 
effectively at the border. We note here only the 
nOn the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was im-
permissible because reasonable suspicion was Jackmg. 
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substantiality of the public interest in the particular prac-
tice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent check~ 
points, which the Government identifies as the most im-
portant of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the 
United States 19-20.12 These checkpoints are located 
on important highways; in their absence such highways 
would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the 
interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many 
smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of 
such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries 
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily 
travelled, slowing their movement and making them 
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885. 
The Government argues persuasively that routine 
checkpoint stops are the most effective means of moni-
toring the major routes inland. A requirement that 
stops on such highways always be based on reasonable 
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of trafficr. 
tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study 
of a given car that would allow it to be identified as pos-
12 The defendants argue at length that the public interest in 
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Govern-
ment because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced other 
than by checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest 
the passage of legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of 
illegal aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive a] •. 
ternative arguments could lead to the raising of insupera-
ble barriers against virtually all search and seizure powers. In any 
event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that 
all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our 
previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest persuasively 
that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints 
could be met without reliance on random stops. Compare Unitecf 
States v. Brignoni.-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 883 (effectiveness of roving 
patrols not defeated by reasoll).ab)e suspicion requirement), with.. 
£'nfra, at 13-14, 
I 
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sibly carrying illegal aliens. Such a requirement also 
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct 
of well-disguised smuggling operations. 
B 
While the need to make random checkpoint stops is 
great, their intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is 
quite limited. The stop does intrude on motorists' right 
to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925), and a.rguably on their 
right to personal security. But it involves only a brief 
detention of travelers during which 
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is 
a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a right to 
be in the United States.' " United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, supra, at 880. 
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the 
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-
also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view check-
point stops in a different light because the subjective 
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on 
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the 
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that 
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than those attend-
ing a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often 
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their 
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic check-
points the motorists can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers~ 
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened 
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at 
894-895, 
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
ment analysis in this context also must take into account 
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. 
422 U. S., at 882--883. We concluded there that random 
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they 
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to 
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the 
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers. . . . [T]hey could stop motorists at random for 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy high-
way, or a desert road . . , ." Ibid. There also 
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion 
would be abused by some officers in the field. Ibid. 
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly 
on the motoring public. First, the potential interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists 
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the 
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, 
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity. The 
regularized manner in which established checkpoints 
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-
abiding motorists, that the stops are duly au-
thorized and believed to serve the public inter-
est. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen 
by officers in the field , but by officials responsible for 
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca-
tion of limited enforcement resources. We may assume 
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as 
a class. Moreover, while the choice of a checkpoint 
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location must be left largely to the discretion of these 
officials, the reasonableness of a given location is subject 
to judicial review. 
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente check-
point suggest that its operation involves a significant 
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small per-
centage of cars a.re referred to the secondary inspection 
area. We do not agree. Referrals are made for the sole 
purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into 
r·esidence status that cannot feasibly be made of every 
motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective in-
trusion of the stop and inquiry thus remains minimal. 
Selective referral may involve some subjective intrusive-
ness, but it remains true that the stops should not be 
frightening or offensive because of their public and 
relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective refer-
rals-rather than questioning the occupants of every 
car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests 
by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring 
public. 
c 
The defendants note correctly that to accommodate 
public and private interests some quantum of in-
dividualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a 
constitutional search or seizure.13 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
13 Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, 
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce la.ws regarding 
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar 
matters . The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be 
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusive-
ness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' posi-
tion, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials 
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As 
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them 
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U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U. S. , at 154. In Camara the Court required an 
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspec~ 
ing private residences within a particular area for build-
ing code violations, but recognized that "specific knowl-
edge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was 
not required to enter any given residence. [ In so holding, ?£ 7 U, S, J .x::t 5'3 %:> 
the Court examined the governmental interest advanced 
to justify such random intrusions "upon the constitution-
ally protected interests of the private citizen," 387 U. S., 
at 534-535, and concluded that under the circumstances 
the Government interest outweighed that of the private 
citizen. 
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here, 
where we deal neither with searches nor with the 
sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded 
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. 
See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its 
operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence. 
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Card~ 
well v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590- 591 ( 1974) (plurality· 
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures fol~ 
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles 
briefly for que tioning has a long history evidencing its utility· 
~nd is accel?ted or motorists as incident to highway use. 
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lowed in making random checkpoint stops makes the re-
sulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate 
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforce-
ment technique is demonstrated by records in the cases 
before us.14 Accordingly, we hold that the stops and 
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of 
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located 
checkpoints.16 
14 The public and private interests discussed here have been 
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note, 
Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Per-
son, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Search Warrants in 
Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 Yale L. J. 355 
(1974). 
16 As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make rou-
tine stops a.t the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question 
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 74-
1560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when 
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 2, supra. The Court of Appeals held 
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant 
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Id., at 
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens 
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of 
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with 
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings spe-
cifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem 
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the 
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant 
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San 
Clemente. 
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above, 
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision 
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol, 
see supra, at 15; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Cle-
mente wa.s reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed. 
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the 
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/6 we perceive no 
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni~ 
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi~ 
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist 
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol 
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor~ 
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.u 
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9, and 
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement 
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of appre-
hensions during the period in question was high, see supra, at 10, 
confirming Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of il-
legal aliens regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San 
Clemente was selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los 
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with 
legitimate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
16 The record in No. 74-1560 does not necessarily support the 
contention that referrals are based solely on apparent Mexican 
ancestry, as less than 1% of the motorists are stopped and the 
defendants themselves note that American citizens of Mexican 
ancestry and legally resident Mexican citizens constitute a large 
proportion of the population of Southern California. Brief for 
Respondents 42--43. Moreover, the Government has informed u~ 
that trained Border Patrol agents rely on factors in addition to. 
apparent Mexican ancestry when selectively stopping motorists. 
Brief for the United States in No. 75--5387, 9; see Brignoni-Ponce,. 
422 U. S., at 884-885. 
u Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area 
during the days surrounding the arrests mvolved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. In these cir-
cumstance , any reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry, see n. 16, 
._\_ • - - I 
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v 
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that random stops 
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has 
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint 
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant 
requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent, 
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code 
inspection, even though the search could be conducted 
absent cause to believe that there were violations in 
the building searched.18 
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt 
model. It involved the search of private residences, for 
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See, 
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment inter-
ests that justify the warrant requirement in that con-
text are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon 
supra, clearly was relevant to the law enforcement need to be served. 
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 887, where we noted 
that "[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry 
is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant 
factor . . . ," although we held that apparent Mexican ancestry 
by itself could not create the reasonable suspicion for a roving-
patrol stop. I d., at 885-887. Different considerations would arise 
if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry 
· at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border. 
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five 
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J ., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however, 
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the in-
( dividualized probable cause to search that otherw1se was necessary 
to sustain the roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspiCIOn 
is not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-· 
Sanchez is not an issue in these eases. 
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privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house 
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with 
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as 
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in 
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to 
which a warrant requirement here would make little con-
tribution. The Court there said: 
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] de-
mands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code in-
volved requires inspection of his premises, no way 
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion." 387 U. S., at 532. 
A warrant provided assurance to tpe occupant on these 
~ we believe that the visible manifestations of 
the field oftfcers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances in this case. 
Other purposes served by the requirement of 
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such pur-
pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United 
States v. Watson, - U. S. -, - n. 22 (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops, 
however, turns on the location and method of operation 
of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the 
distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to 
post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a war-
rant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to 
substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of 
the searching or seizing officer, United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 316--318 (1972), but 
the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize'• 
is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field. 
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VI 
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning 
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
thorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim-
itations on the scope of the stop, See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S., at 24--27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint 
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or 
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. 
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops 
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention .. ,. 
must be based on consent or probable cause." United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the de-
fendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers 
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,. 
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We re· 
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the 
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other· 
case& to the District Court for further proceedings. 
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses 
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. 
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint 
operated by the Border Patrol away from the interna-
tional border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion 
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of 
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth 
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth 
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether 
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief 
questioning of its occupants even though there is no 
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal 
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975) . We hold 
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a. 
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by 
a judicial warrant. 
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A 
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in 
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made 
on three different occasions at the permanent immigra-
tion checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. 
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego 
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is 
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We pre-
viously have described the checkpoint as follows: 
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
.. is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, 
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a 
mile further north are two black on yellow signs 
suspended over the highway with flashing lights 
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the 
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of 
California weighing station, are two large signs with 
flashing red. lights suspended over the highway. 
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OF-
FICERS." Placed on the highway are a number 
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes 
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, 
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks 
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are offi-
cial U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary 
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for 
nighttime operation.' " United States v. Ortiz, 
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F . 
Supp. 398, 410- 411 (SD Cal. 1973). 
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of 
traffic visually screens a.ll northbound vehicles, which the 
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. 1 
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with~ 
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a 
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will 
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs· 
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their oc-
cupants are asked about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status. The Government informs us that at San 
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the 
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief 
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the second-
ary inspection area could be based on something suspi-
cious about a particular car passing through the check-
point, but the Government concedes that none of the 
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any 
articulable suspicion. During the period when these 
stops were made, the checkpoint was operating under 
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which au-
thorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop 
operation at the San Clemente-location. 2 
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved· 
1 The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the 
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely-
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute 
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motor-
ists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been 
"seized." 
2 The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was 
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rou--
tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without 
such a warrant . See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974), 
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v. 
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F. 2d 7 ( 1974). Soon after the warrant issued, 
the Court of Appeals also held unconstitutional routine checkpoint 
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer~­
R-.ivera,. 500 F . 2'd 313' (.W741). Se~ also n_ 15, inf.ra. 
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the 
case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached 
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two fe-
,male passengers. The women were illegal Mexican 
a.liens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro 
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused 
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported 
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to 
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro-
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident 
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the 
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts 
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. 
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evi-
dence stemming from the stop on the ground that the 
operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.8 The motion to suppress was de-
nied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury 
trial. 
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass 
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing 
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by pre-
arrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been 
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the second-
ary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the 
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged in two counts 
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) 
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C. 
8 Each of the defendants in No. 74--1560 and the defendant in 
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony 
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "lt]here may be 
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial, 
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized 
or statements overheard, is subject tQ suppression . . . ." The 
question again is not before us. 
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived 
from the stop was granted. 
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Me-
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen 
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passen-
gers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area re-
vealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal 
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three 
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had 
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near 
Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen, 
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan 
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans-
porting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of 
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4), 
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress. 
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the 
Government appealed the granting of the motions to 
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia 
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan.4 The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three 
appeals, which presented the common question whether 
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment.5 The Court of Ap~ 
peals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops 
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop 
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol 
4 The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different dis-
trict judge than were the other cases. 
5 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the 
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under 
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were 
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved 
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be made 
absent a warra.nt, 
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the 
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's 
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the 
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand. 
B 
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar-
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S. 
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates 
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways 
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The 
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Browns-
ville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the 
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the 
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente, 
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that 
the officers customarily stop all northbound motor-
ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers 
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved 
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the 
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was con-
ducted without a judicial warrant. 
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any 
visible passengers. When an agent approached his ve-
hicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the 
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down 
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger 
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United 
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the 
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across 
the Rio Grande. 
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally 
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a)(2). He 
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the· 
evidence derived from the stop. The motion was de,. 
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nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes 
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal, 
contending primarily that stops made without rea-
son to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are 
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an un-
published order, relying on its opinion in United States 
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court 
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.6 
II 
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law 
enforcement technique considered important by those 
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn-
ing to the constitutional question, we examine the con-
text in which it arises. 
A 
It has been national policy for many yea.rs to limit 
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968, 
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, 
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Supp., at 402. Many more aliens than can be accommo-
dated under the quota want to live and work in the 
United States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens 
seek illegally to enter or to remajn in the United States. 
We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of 
illegal immigrants [already] in the United States vary 
6 We initia.Jly granted the Government's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. -, and later granted Sifuentes' 
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in 
tandem. - U. S. - . Subsequently we granted the motion of 
the Solicitor General to conSQlidate the cases for oral argument. 
-u.s.-. 
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widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a 
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as 
many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country." 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 
(1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of 
the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the 
fact that economic opportunities are significantly greater 
in the United States than they are in Mexico. United 
States v. Baca, supra, at 402. 
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico 
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin-
cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at 
405. The United States shares a border with Mex-
ico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the 
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated 
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains per-
sonnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions 
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals 
to enter the United States without detection. It also is 
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of 
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully 
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain 
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country, 
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employ-
ment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by 
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers 
who transport them in private vehicles. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879. 
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland 
traffic-checking operations on an effort to minimize 
7 The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued 
to simplify passage between interrelated American and Mexican 
communities along the border. These pass<>s authonze travel wJthin-
25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212 .6· 
(1976). 
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illegal immigratio/. ( ermanent checkpoints, such as 
those at San Clemente and Sarita, are maintained at 
or near intersections of important roads leading away 
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis 
designed to avoid circumvention by s~glers and 
others who transport the illegal alien ~ '2.,-temporary 
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occa-
sionally -are established in other strategic locations. 
Fina~oving patrols are maintained to supplement the 
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973). 8 In fiscal 1973, 175,-
511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the 
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border 
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior ap-
prehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens.9 
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at check-
points, though precise figures are not available. United 
States v. Baca, supm, at 405, 407 and n. 2. 
B 
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, 
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anum-
ber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to as-
8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory author-
izations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those be-
lieved to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and 
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1357 (a)(1), (a)(3) . 
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3) 
may be exercised anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR 
§ 287.1 (a.) (1976). 
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a 
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration 
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official 
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal. 
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution. 
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug--
glers, many of whom are lawfllily in the United States. 
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant 
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic 
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the 
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away 
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts 
vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a 
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and 
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes," 
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 406. 
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete 
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint. 
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint loca-
tion each year, although the checkpoint actually is in 
operation only about 70% of the time.10 In calendar 
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were 
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974 
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint 
during 124116 hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles 
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where 
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered 
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar 
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have 
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the 
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass 
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in 
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical 
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it 
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there, 
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as 
every motorist is questioned. 
10 The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of 
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages, 
wel;Lther conditions, and~at San Clemente-peak traffic loads 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and 
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppres~ 
sive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals. See United States-
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz, 
422 U. S., at 895; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 528 ( 1967). In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the· 
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth 
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases 
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations. 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the ques-
tion was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally 
could search a vehicle10'ri11egai aliens simply because it 
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized 
that important law enforcement interests were at stake 
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so sig-
nificantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that. 
a search could be conducted without consent only if there 
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal 
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant au-
thorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given 
area. Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283-285 (PowELL, 
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same· 
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a 
permanent checkpoint. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, 
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve 
a different balance of public and private interests ancf 
appropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional 
safeguards. The q_uestion w.a8 under what circumstances 
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area 
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence 
status. We found that the interference with Fourth 
Amendment interests involved in such a stop was "mod-
est," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law 
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving~ 
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and 
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of 
specific articulable facts, together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, that reasonably warrant sus-
picion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at 
884.11 
IV 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defend~ 
ants contend primarily that the routine stopping of ve-
hicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brig,noni-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion. Sifuentes alternatively contends 
in No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are per-
missible only when the practicf;) has the advance judicial 
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant au-
thorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita. 
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if 
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to 
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid 
'Stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interest-5 
at stake. 
A 
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance 
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary 
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be con trolled 
effectively at the border. We note here only the 
11 On the facts of the case, we concluded that tlw stop was lin-
permissible because reasonable suspicion wax lacking. 
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-substantiality of the public interest in the particular prac-
tice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent check ... 
points, which the Government identifies as the most im .. 
portant of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the 
United States 19-20.12 These checkpoints are located 
on important highways; in their absence such highways 
would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the 
interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many 
smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of 
such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries 
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily 
travelled, slowing their movement and making them 
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883- 885. 
A requirement that stops on major routes inland 
always be based on reasonable suspicion would be 
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too 
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car 
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier 
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement 
would la.rgely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct 
1 2 The defendants argue at length that the public interest in 
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Govern-
ment because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced othel' 
than by checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest 
the passage of legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of 
illegal aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive a1 .. 
ternative arguments could lead to the raising of insupera-
ble barriers against virtually all search and seizure powers. In any 
event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that 
all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our 
previous cases reject . The defendants do not suggest persuasively 
that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints 
could be met without reliance on routme checkpoint stops. Compare 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. 8., at 883 (effectiveness of 
roving patrols not defeate_d by reasonable suspicion requirement). 
wit,h infra , at. 13-14.. 
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of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though 
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly. 
B 
While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is 
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment 
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a 
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage with-
out interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 
154 (1925), and arguably on their right to personal secu-
rity. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers 
during which 
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is 
a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a right to 
be in the United States.'" United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, supra, at 880. 
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the 
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-
also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view check-
point stops in a different light because the subjective 
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on 
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the 
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that 
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than those attend-
ing a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often 
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their 
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic check-
points the motorists can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' 
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened 
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at 
894-895. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
ment analysis in this context also must take into account 
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. 
422 U. S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random 
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they 
"would subject the residents of . .. [border] areas to 
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the 
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers. • . . [They] could stop motorists at random for· 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy high-
way, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also 
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion 
would be abused by some officers in the field. lbia. 
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly 
on the motoring public. First, the potential interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists-
using these high ways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the 
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, 
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity. ThtY 
regularized manner in which established checkpoints· 
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-
abiding motorists, that the stops are duly au-
thorized and believed to serve the public inter-
est. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen 
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for 
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca-
tion of limited enforcement resources. We may assume-
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as 
a class. And since field offic.ers. may stop only those cars. 
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passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or 
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case 
of roving-patrol stops. Mor.eover, while the choice of a 
checkpoint location must be left largely to the discretion 
of these officials, the reasonableness of a given location 
is subject to post-stop judicial review. 
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente check-
point suggest that its operation involves a significant 
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small per-
centage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection 
area, thereby "stigmatizing" those stopped and reducing 
the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motor-
ists. We think defendants overstate the consequences. 
Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting 
a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that 
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the 
traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop 
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral 
may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that 
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because 
of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover, 
selective referrals-rather than questioning the occupants 
of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment 
interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general 
motoring public. 
c 
The defendants note correctly that to accommodate 
public and private interests some quantum of in-
dividualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a 
constitutional search or seizure.18 See Terry v. Ohio, 392' 
18 Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, 
:are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding· 
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar 
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be 
administrative is of limited relevance m weighing their intrusive-
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U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U. S., at 154. In Camara the Court required an 
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspect.. 
ing private residences within a particular area for build-
ing code violations, but recognized that "specific knowl-
edge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was 
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at 
538. In so holding, the Court examined the govern-
mental interest advanced to justify such random intru-
sions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of 
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that 
under the circumstances the government interest out-
weighed that of the private citizen. 
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here, 
where we deal neither with searches nor with the 
sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded 
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. 
See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its 
operation are significantly different from the traditional 
ness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' posi-
tion, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials 
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As 
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them 
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles 
brieffy for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility 
a.nd is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use. 
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expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence. 
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality 
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures fol-
lowed in making these checkpoint stops makes the re-
sulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate 
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforce-
ment technique is demonstrated by records in the cases 
before us.14 Accordingly, we hold that the stops and 
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of 
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located 
checkpoints.16 
14 The public and private interests discussed here have been 
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note, 
Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Per-
son, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Sea.rch Warrants in 
Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 Yale L. J. 355 
(1974) . 
15 As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make rou-
tine stops at the San Clemente checkpomt, the principal question 
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 74-
1560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when 
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 2, supm. The Court of Appeals held 
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 
·F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant 
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. !d., at 
321-322. In reaching the 1.-.tter conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens 
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of 
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with 
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings spe-
cifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem 
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the 
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant 
is not required, it is unreasonable to locatE' a checkpoint at San 
Clemente. 
We answer this question in the negativE>. As indicated above,. 
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision 
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the 
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/6 we perceive no 
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi-
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist 
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol 
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol, 
see supra, a.t 15; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 
( 1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Cle~ 
mente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed 
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and 
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement 
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of appre-
hensions during the period in question was high, see supra, at 10, 
confirmmg Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of il-
legal aliens regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San 
Clemente was selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los 
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with 
legitimate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents 
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when 
selectively stopping motorists Brief for United States in No. 75-
5387, 9; see United States v. B1'ignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884-885. 
This assertion finds support. in the record. Less than 1% of the 
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning, 
whereas the defendants themselves note that American citizens of 
Mexican ancestry and legally resident Mexican cit1zens constitute 
a much larger proportion of the population of Southern California. 
Brief for Respondents, at 42-43 . It thus appears that the Border 
Patrol does not place extensive reliance on apparent Mexican 
ancestry standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary· 
inspection area. 
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officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor~ 
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.17 
v 
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops 
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has 
given judicia1 authorization to the particular checkpoint 
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant 
requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent, 
an uarea" warrant was required to make a building code 
inspection, even though the search could be conducted 
absent cause to believe that there were violations in 
the building searched.18 
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt 
H Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area 
during the days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
rougly 20% contained illegal aliens. S'l.f,pra, at 10. Thus, to the extent 
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this 
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law 
enforcement need to be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given 
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make 
Mexican appearance a relevant factor ... ," although we held that 
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable 
suspicion for a roving-patrol stop . ld., at 885-887. Different con-
siderations would arise if, for example, reliance wrre put on apparent 
Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border. 
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the 
concurring and dissenting opimons ip Almeida-Sanchez v. Unitea 
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) , which commanded the votes of five 
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J ., dissenting). The burden of these opimons, however, 
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the in-
.dividua.lized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary 
to sustain the roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion 
is not necessary here, the warrant funct10n discussed in Almeida-
Sanche~ is not an issue in these cases. 
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model. It involved the search of private residences, for 
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See, 
e. g. , McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment inter-
ests that justify the warrant requirement in that con-
text are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon 
privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house 
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with 
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as 
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in 
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to 
which a warrant requirement here would make little con-
tribution. The; Court there said : 
" [W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] de-
mands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code in-
volved requires inspection of his premises, no way 
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion." 387 U. S., at 532. 
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these 
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of 
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances in this case. 
Other purposes served by the requirement of 
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such pur-
pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. Unitea 
States v. Watson, - U.S. -,- n. 22 (MARSHALL, 
J. , dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops, 
however, turns on factors such as the location and 
method of operation of the checkpoint, factors that are 
not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, and there-
fore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding 
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the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant 
r·equirement is to substitute the judgment of the magis-
trate for that of the searching or seizing officer. United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 
316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced when 
the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the 
officer in the field, and deference is to be given to the 
administrative decisions of higher ranking officials. 
VI 
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning 
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con~ 
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
thorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim~ 
itations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S., at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint 
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or 
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. 
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops 
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ..• 
must be based on consent or probable cause." United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the de-
fendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers 
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the· 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,. 
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the 
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other 
ca-ses to the District Court for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
JUN 2 9 1976 
I 11 I J. 11 J, o, ,z,, ), ' 





SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 74-1560 AND 75-5387 
U 't d St te p t't' l On Writ of Certiorari to m e a s, e 1 wner, . 
74-1560 v. the Umted States Court 
. · of Appeals for the 
Amado Martmez-Fuerte et al. Ninth Circuit. 
Rodolfo Sifuentes Petitioner l On Writ of Certiorari to 
75-5387 ' ' the United States Court 
. dv.S of Appeals for the Fifth 
Umte tates. Circuit. 
[June - , 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses 
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. 
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint 
operated by the Border Patrol away from the interna-
tional border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion 
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of 
the checkpoint was jncompatible with the Fourth 
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth 
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether 
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief 
questioning of its occupants even though there is no 
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal 
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975) We hold 
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a 
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by 
a judicial warrant. 
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I 
A 
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in 
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made 
on three different occasions at the permanent immigra-
tion checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. 
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego 
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is 
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We pre-
viously have described the checkpoint as follows: 
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, 
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a 
mile further north are two black on yellow signs 
suspended over the highway with flashing lights 
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the 
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of 
California weighing station, are two large signs with 
flashing red lights suspended over the highway. 
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OF-
FICERS." Placed on the highway are a number 
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes 
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, 
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks 
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are offi-
cial U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary 
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for 
nighttime operation.'" United States v. Ortiz, 
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F . 
Supp. 398, 410- 411 (SD Cal. 1973). 
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of 
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the 
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt.1 
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with~ 
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a 
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will 
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs 
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their oc-
cupants are asked about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status. The Government informs us that at San 
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the 
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief 
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the second-
ary inspection area could be based on something suspi-
cious about a particular car passing through the check~ 
point, but the Government concedes that none of the 
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any 
articulable suspicion. During the period when these 
stops were made, the checkpoint was opera.ting under 
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which au-
thorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop 
operation at the San Clemente location.2 
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved 
1 The partie'! disa.gree as to whether vehicles not referred to the 
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely 
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Rffiolution of this dispute 
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motor-
ists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been 
"seized." 
2 The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was 
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Count 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rou-
tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without 
such a wn,rmnt . See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974), 
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v. 
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F . 2d 7 (1974) . Soon after the warrant issued, 
the Court of Appeals also held unconstitutional routine checkpoint 
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer.=-
Rivera, 500 F. 2d 313 ( 1974). See also n. 15, infra_. 
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the-
case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached 
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two fe-
male passengers. The w:omen were illegal Mexican 
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro 
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused 
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported 
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to 
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro-
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident 
alien, but his 'passengers admitted _being present in the 
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts 
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. 
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress ali evi-
dence stemming from the stop on the ground that the 
operation of the checkpoint wa.S in violation of the· 
Fourth Amendment.3 The motion to suppress was de-
nied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury 
trial. 
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass 
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing 
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by pre-
arrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been 
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the second-
ary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the 
passenger, and Jirriinez-Garcia was cha.rged in two counts 
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) 
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C. 
3 Each of the defendants in No. · 74-1560 and the defendant in 
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony 
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. '2 (1975), that "[t]here may be 
· room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial, 
as opposed to a· Government agent's testimony about objects seized 
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . · ." The 
,, question agam is not before ·us. 
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived. 
from the stop was granted. 
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Me-
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen 
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passen-
gers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area re-
vealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal 
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three 
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had 
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near 
Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen, 
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan 
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans-
porting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of 
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., § 1324 (a)(4), 
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress. 
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the 
Government appealed the granting of the motions to 
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia 
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan! The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three 
appeals, which presented the common question whether 
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment.5 The Court of Ap-· 
peals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops 
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop 
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol 
4 The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different dis-
trict judge than were the other cases. 
6 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the 
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under 
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were 
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved 
the question whetli.er routine checkpoint stops could be mad~ 
a"!ment. a warrant, 
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the 
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's 
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the 
other cases. 514 F . 2d 308. We reverse ~nd remand, 
B 
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar-
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S. 
Highway 77 near Sarita, 'Tex. Highway 77 originates 
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways 
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The 
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Browns-
ville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the 
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the 
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente, 
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that 
the officers customarily .stop all northbound motor-
ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers 
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved 
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the 
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was con-
ducted without a judicial warrant. 
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any 
visible passengers. When an agent approached his ve-
hicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the 
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down 
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger 
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United 
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the 
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across·· 
the Rio Grande. 
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally 
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2) . He · 
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the-
~vidence derived from the stop. The motion was de .. 
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nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes 
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal, 
contending primarily that stops made without rea-
son to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are 
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an un-
published order, relying on its opinion in United States 
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court 
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.6 
II 
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law 
enforcement technique considered important by those 
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn-
ing to the constitutional question, we examine the con-
text in which it arises. 
A 
It has been national policy for many years to limit 
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968, 
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, 
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Supp., at 402. Many more aliens than can be accommo-
dated under the quota want to live and work in the 
United States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens 
seek illegally to enter or to remain in the United States. 
We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of 
illegal immigrants [already] in the United States vary 
6 We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. -, and later granted Sifuentes' 
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in 
tandem. - U. S. -. Subsequently we granted the motion of 
the Solicitor General to couSQ!id.at!:l the cases for oral argument. 
~u. s. -, 
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Widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a 
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as 
many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country." 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 
(1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of 
the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the 
fact that economic opportunities are significantly greater 
in the United States than they are in Mexico. United 
States v. Baca, supra, at 402. 
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico 
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin-
cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at 
405. The United States shares a border with Mex-
ico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the 
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated 
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains per-
sonnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions 
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals 
to enter the United States without detection. It also is 
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of 
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully 
·but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain 
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country, 
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employ-
ment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by 
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers 
who transport them in private vehicles. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879. 
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland 
traffic-checking operations in an effort to minimize 
7 The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued 
· to simplify passage - between interrelated American and Mexican 
communities along the border. These passes authorize travel within 
25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period See 8 CFR § 212.6. 
I ( 1976). 
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illegal immigration. Permanent checkpoints, such as 
those at San Clemente and Sarita, are maintained at 
or near intersections of important roads leading away 
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis 
designed to avoid circumvention by smugglers and 
others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary 
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occa-
sionally are established in other strategic locations. 
Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the 
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).8 In fiscal 1973, 175,-
511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the 
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border 
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior ap-
prehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens.9 
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at check-
points, though precise figures are not available. United 
States v. Baca, supra, at 405, 407 and n. 2. 
B 
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, 
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a num-
ber of factors. 'The Border Patrol believes that to as-
8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory author-
izations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those be-
lieved to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and 
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. '§§ 1357 (a) (1), (a) (3) . 
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3) 
may be exercised anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR 
§ 287.1 (a) (1976) . 
0 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a 
person who has ·been found to be deportable · by an immigration 
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official 
agents." Unitea States v. Baca, '368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal. 
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution. 
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-
glers, many of whom are lawfully in the United States. 
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant 
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic 
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the 
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away 
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain ' that· restricts 
vehicle passage around the checkpoint~ (iv) on a 
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and 
(v) beyond the 25-mile zo.ne in which "border passes," 
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 406. 
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete 
picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente check-
point. Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint 
location each year, al~hough the checkpoint actually is in 
operation only about 70% of the time.10 In calendar 
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were 
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974 
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint 
during 124Ys hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles 
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where 
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered 
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar 
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have· 
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the 
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass 
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in 
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical" 
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it 
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there, 
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as 
every motorist is questioned. 
10 The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of 
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages, 
weather conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads. 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and 
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppres-
sive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals. See Unzted States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz, 
422 U. S., at 895; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 528 (1967). In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the 
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth 
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases 
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations. 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, ~'Upra, the ques-
tion was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally 
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it 
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized 
that important law enforcement interests were at stake 
but held that. searche~ by roving patrols impinged so sig-
nificantly on Fourth Amendment privacy mterests that 
a search could be conducted without consent only if there 
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal 
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant au-
thorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given 
area. Compare id., at 273~ with id., at 283-285 (PowELL, 
J., concurring) , and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting) . 
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same 
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a 
permanent checkpoint. 
[n United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, 
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve 
a different balance of public and private interests and 
a,ppropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional 
::~afeguards. The question was under what circumstances 
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area' 
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence 
status. We found that the interference with Fourth 
Amendment interests involved in such a stop was "mod-
-est," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law 
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving .. 
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and 
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of 
specific articulable facts, together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, that reasonably warrant sus-
picion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at 
884.11 
IV 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within 
the meaning of ·the Fourth Amendment. The defend .. 
ants contend. primarily that the routine stopping of ve-
hicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends 
in No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are per-
missible only when the practice has the advance judicial 
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant au-
thorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita. 
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if 
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to 
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid 
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests 
at stake. 
A 
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance 
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary 
·because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled 
11 On the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was im-
permissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking. 
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effectively ·at the border. We note here only the 
substantiality of the public interest in the practice of 
routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a 
practice which the Government identifies as the most im~ 
portant of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the 
United States 19-20.12 These checkpoints are located 
on important highways; in their absence such highways 
would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into ·the 
interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many 
smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of 
such ·highways. And the prospect of such inquities 
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily 
travelled, slowing their movement and making them 
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885. 
A requirement that stops on major routes inland 
always be based on reasonable suspicion would be 
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too 
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car 
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier 
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement 
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct 
12 The defendants argue at length that the public interest . in 
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted · by the Govern-
ment because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by 
means other than checkpoint operatiOns. As one alternative they 
suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal 
aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative argu. 
ments could raise insurperable barriers to the exercise of virtually 
all search and seizure powers. In any event , these arguments 
tend to go to the general proposition that all t raffic-checking pro-
cedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject . The 
defendants do not suggest persuasively that the part icular law en-
forcement needs served by checkpoints could be met with reliance 
on routine checkpoint stops. Compare United States v. Brigno1li-
Ponce, 422 U. S. , at 883 , effectivenrss of roving patrons not defea ted 
by reasonable suspicion requirement) , with infra, at 13-14. 
: 
' ' 
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of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though 
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.1 
B 
While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is 
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment 
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a 
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage with-
out interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 
·, 154 (1925), and arguably on their right to personal secu-
rity. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers 
during which 
"'[a] 11 that is required of the vehicle's occupants· is 
a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a right to 
be in the United States.' " Unite'd States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, supra, at 880. 
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants · is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the 
stop itself, the questioning, arid the visual inspection-
also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view check-
point stops in a different light because the subjective 
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on 
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the 
·case of a ·checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that 
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than those attend-
ing a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often 
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their 
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic check-
points the motorists can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' 
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened 
... 
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at 
894-895. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
ment analysis in this context also must take into account 
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. 
422 U.S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random 
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they 
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to 
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the 
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers. • . . [They] could stop motorists at random for 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy high-
way, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also 
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion 
would be abused by some officers in the field. Ibid. 
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly 
on the motoring public. First, the potential interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists 
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the 
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, 
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity. The 
regularized manner in which established checkpoints 
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-
abiding motorists, that the stops are duly au-
thorized and believed to serve the public inter-
est. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen 
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible fol' 
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca-
tion of limited enforcement resources. We may assume 
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as 
u class. And since field officers may stop only those c~ 
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passing the checkpoint1 there is less room for abusive or 
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case 
of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a par-~ 
ticular exercise of discretion 'in locating or operating a 
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judi-
cial review.13 
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente check-
point suggest that its operation involves a significant 
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small per-
centage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection 
area, thereby "stigmatizingjj those stopped and reducing 
the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motor-
ists. We think defendants overstate the consequences. 
·Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting 
a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that 
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the 
traffic -is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop 
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral 
may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that 
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because 
· of their public and relative1y routine nature. Moreover, 
· selective referrals--rather than questioning the occupants 
· of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment 
· interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general 
motoring public. 
c 
"The defendants note correctly that to accommodate 
public and private interests some quantum of in-
, dividualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a 
1s The choice of checkpoint locations must be left largely to the I 
' discretion of Border Patrol officials, to be exercised in accordance 
with statutes and regulations that may be applicable. See n. 15, 
infra. Many incidents of checkpoint operatiOn also must be com• 
mitted to the discretion of such officials. But see infra, at 22. 
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constitutional search or seizure.14 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
supra, at 283--285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U. S., at 154. In Camara the Court required an 
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspect-
ing private residences within a particular area for build-
ing code violations, but recognized that "specific knowl-
edge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was 
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at 
538. In so holding, the Court examined the govern-
ment interests advanced to justify such routine intru- I 
sions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of 
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that 
under the circumstances the government interests out-
weigh those of the private citizen. 
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here, 
where we deal neither with searches nor with the 
14 Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, 
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding 
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar 
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be 
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusive-
ness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' posi-
tion, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials 
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the· 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As 
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them 
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles 
briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility-
and is accel?ted ~ l'llPl<.oY.ists as in.cic;ient to highway use. 
74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION 
18 UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded 
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. 
See, e. (J., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its 
' operation . are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence. 
United States v. 'Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality 
' opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures fol-
lowed in making these checkpoint stops makes the re-
sulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal. 
On the other ·hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate 
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforce-
ment technique is demonstrated by the records in the 
cases before us. Accordingly, we hold that the stops and J 
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of 
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located 
·checkpoints.16 
u As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make rou-
tine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question 
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 74-
1560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when 
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 2, supra. The Court of Appeals held 
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 
F . 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant 
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Jd., at 
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens 
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of 
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with 
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings spe-
cifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem 
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the 
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant 
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San 
Clemente. 
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above, 
lf8, It./ 0, 
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the 
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/6 we perceive no 
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision 
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol, 
see supra, at 15; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Cle-
mente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed 
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and 
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement 
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of a re-
hensions d.1.u:iHg Ul.11 ~ePi:sa iR 'J'llliiti8H .,, ftEI high, e supra, at 10, 
confirming Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of il-
legal aliens regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San 
Clemente was selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los 
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with 
legitimate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents 
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when 
selectively stopping motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75--
5387, 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 884-885. 
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the 
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning, 
whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and lega.Uy resident 
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the 
population of Southern California, The 1970 census figures, which 
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California 
to be approximately 19,9f1Joo of whom some ~,117 ,9e8, er 12-%, 
are · · . The equivalent percentages 
for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are and 18 
_t~~~~~-JJ~ S. Dept. of Gtmgress, 0 Census of Population, 
vol. 1, pt. 6, If the statewide population ratio 
is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through 
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in 
No. 74-1560, roughly 1 ould ·be expected to contain person~ 
3 /I J,. INJ1 v-1 /' ,0 , 'I 
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constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi~ 
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist 
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol 
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor~ 
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.17 
v 
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops 
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has 
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint 
location and the practice of routine stops. A warrant 
requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent, 
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code 
inspection, even though the search could be conducted 
absent cause to believe that there were ·violations in 
the building searched.18 
of Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 wer. e referred to the I 
secondary area. This appPars to refute any suggestion that the 
Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry 
standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary area. 
u Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area 
during the days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74--1560, 
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. Thus, to the extent 
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this 
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law 
enforcement need to ·be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given 
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make 
Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . ," although we held that 
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable 
suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop. !d., at 885-887. Different 
considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on appar-
ent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian 
border, ' 
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
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We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt 
model. It involved the search of private residences, for 
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See, 
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment inter-
ests that justify the warrant requirement in that con-
text are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon 
privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house 
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with 
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as 
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in 
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to 
which a warrant requirement here would make little con-
tribution. The Court there said: 
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] de-
mands entry, the occupant has no . way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code in-
volved requires inspection of his premises, no way 
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion." 387 U. S., at 532. 
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these 
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of 
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances in this case. 
Other purposes served by the requirement of 
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such pur-
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five 
Justices. See icl., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however, 
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the in-
dividualized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary 
to sustain roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion is 
not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-
Sanc&l:a is not an issw i:m these cases. 
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pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United 
States v. Watson, - U. S. -. -, - n. 22 (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops, 
however, turns on factors such as the location and 
method of operation of the checkpoint, factors that are 
not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, and there-
fore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding 
the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant 
requirement is to substitute the judgment of the magis-
trate for that of the searching or seizing officer. United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 
316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced when 
the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the 
officer in the field, and deference is to be given to the 
administrative decisions of higher ranking officials. 
VI 
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning 
Toutinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
thorized by warrant.u The principal protection of Fourth 
19 MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted 
concern in suggesting that today's decision marks a radical new 
intrusion on citizens' rights: It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth 
Amendment protections," and states that the Court "virtually 
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement.':_' ...,J:..~,..--t-­
at 1, 2. Since 1946, 60 Congress 
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interro-
gated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance" 
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The 
San Clemente checkpoint has been operating at or near its present 
location throughout the intervening S&'years. Our prior cases have "1- f 
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization, 
requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and 
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra, 
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief 
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Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim-
itations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S., at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint 
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or 
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. 
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops 
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ... 
questioning (a type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to 
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither 
longstanding congressional authorization nor widely prevailing prac-
tices justify a constitutional violation, We do suggest, however, 
that against this background and in the context of our recent 
ic of ifi oncern. 
The dissenting opinion also asserts that "the stopped vehicles 
cupants are certainly subjected to 'search' as well as 
st, at 4. This is indeed novel doctrine. As early 
as United St es v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 563 (1927), Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, spea g for a unanimous Court, held that a visual inspec-
tion of a ship ru d by a searchlight was not a search witilln the 
meaning of the Four If such an inspection of a 
vessel is not a "search," one hardl would think that looking 
through the windows of an automobile co · a search. The 
more pertinent question is whether the enforcem t agent has a 
right to be in the vantage point from which he m s his observa~ 
tion, as he does here because of his authority to rna y 
stop. Moreover, in Brignoni-Ponce, an opinion joined by MR. 
JusTICE BRENNAN, we made clear that a stop for questioning 
involves "no search of the vehicle or its occupants." 422 U. S., 
at 
The dissenting opinion further warns: 
"Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican 
alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that 
he travels the fixed checkpoint illghways at [his] risk . . .• " Post, 
a.t 6. 
For. the reason stated in n. 16, supra, this concern is misplaced. 
Moreover, upon a proper showing, courts would not be powerless 
to prevent the misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican 
ancestry. 
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must be based on consent or probable cause." Unitea 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the de-
fendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers 
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,. 
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the 
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other 
cases to the District Court for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
.: 
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses 
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. 
Each defendant Wf1S arrested a~ a permanent checkpoint 
operated by the Border Patrol away from the interna-
tional border with Me~ico, ~nd each sought the exclusion 
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of 
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth 
,Amendment. In each inst11nce wh~ther the Fourt4 
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether 
11 vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief 
questioning of its occupants even though there is no 
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal 
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold 
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a 
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by 
a judicial warrant. 
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I 
A 
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in 
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made 
on three different occasions at the permanent immigra-
tion checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. 
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego 
.and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is 
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We pre-
viously have described the checkpoint as follows: 
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on ye'lllow sign with flashing yello·w 
qights over the highw.ay stating "ALL VEHICLES, 
,'STOP AHEAD, 1 M'ILE." Three-quarters of a 
mile further north aJre 'two b1ack on yellow signs 
suspended over the highway with flashing lights 
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the 
checkpoint, which is a]so the location of a State of 
California weighing station, are two large signs with 
Hashing red lights suspended over the highway. 
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OF-
FICERS." Placed on the highway are a number 
·~f orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes 
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, 
·standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks 
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are offi-
cial U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary 
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for 
nighttime operation.'" United States v. Ortiz, 
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Supp. 398, 410--411 (SD Cal. 1973). 
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of 
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the 
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt.1 
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with-
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a 
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will 
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs 
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their oc-
cupants are asked about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status. The Government informs us that at San 
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the 
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief 
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the second-
ary inspection area could be based on something suspi-
cious about a particular car passing through the check-
point, but the Government concedes that none of the 
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any 
articulable suspicion. During the period when these 
stops were made, the checkpoint was operating under 
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which au-
thorized the Border Patrol to conduct a routine-stop 
operation at the San Clemente location.2 
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved 
1 The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the 
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely 
~'roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute 
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motor-
~sts passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been 
t•seized." 
2 The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was 
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rou-
tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without 
such a warrant. See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974), 
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v. 
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F. 2d 7 (1974). Soon after the warrant issued, 
the Court of Appeals also held unconstitutional routine checkpoint 
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer-
Rivera, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974). See also n. 15, infra. 
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in No. 74.-1560, and the procedural history of the 
case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached 
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two fe-
male passengers. The women were illegal Mexican 
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro 
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused 
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported 
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to 
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro· 
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident 
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the 
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts 
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. 
§ .1324 (a) (2). He inoved befo'te trial to suppress all evi··· 
dence stemming from the stop on the ground that the 
o.peration of t~1e chec~poinf was in violation of the 
Fourth .t\mendment.8 The motion to supj:wess was de-
nied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury 
triaL 
· Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass 
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing 
one passenger.. :ije had. pi.cked. the passenger up by pre-
arrangement in San Ysidro after the latter ·haa 'been 
&muggled across the border. Questioning at 'the second-
ary inspectiO!l area revealed' the illegal status of the 
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged. in 'two counts 
wjth illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. 'S. C. § 1324 (a) 
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C. 
8 Each of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in 
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony 
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]here may be 
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial, 
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized 
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . .. " The 
' question again is not before us. 
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived 
from the stop was granted. 
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Me-
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen 
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wi£e as passen-
gers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area re-
vealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal 
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three 
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had 
1ed the other aliens across the border at the beach near 
'Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen, 
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan 
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans-
·porting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 13Z4 (a) (2), four counts of 
'inducing the illegal en try of aliens, id., § 1324 (a) ( 4), 
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress. 
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the 
Gov.ernment appealed the granting of the motions to 
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia 
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan.4 The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three 
·.appeals, which presented the common question whether 
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment.5 The Court of Ap-
peals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops 
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop 
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol 
4 The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a clifferent dis-
trict judge than were the other cases. 
5 11le principal question before the Court of Appeals was the 
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under 
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were 
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved 
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be made 
absent a warrant. 
l' 
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the 
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's 
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the 
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand. 
B 
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar-
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S. 
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates 
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways 
running north 'from the lower Rio Grande valley. The 
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Browns-
ville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the 
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the 
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente, 
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that 
the officers customarily stop all northbound motor-
"ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers 
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved 
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the 
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was con-
ducted without a judicial warrant. 
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any 
visible passengers. When an agent approached the ve-
hicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the 
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down 
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger 
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United 
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the 
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming acrOSSJ 
the Rio Grande. 
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally 
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). He 
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the 
tevidence derived from the stop. The motion was de-
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nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes 
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal, 
contending primarily that stops made without rea-
son to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are 
\mconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Cl.rcuit affirmed the conviction in an un-
published order, relying on 1,ts opinion in United States 
v. Santibanez,'517 F. 2d 922 (1975,). There the Court 
,. of Appeals ha.d ruled that routip:e checkpoint stops are 
·consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.6 
1' ., ,.II ,' ., •. I · ' .... ' . ~· 
( The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits are in conflict on the copstitutionality of a law 
. enforcement technique considered important by those 
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn-
. ing to the ·constitutional question, we examine the con-
text in which it arises. 
A 
It has been national policy for many years to limit 
· immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968, 
:the annual quota for immigrants from all independent 
·countries of'"t)1e Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, 
has been 120;000 persons. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 
"No. 89-236, § 21 (e), 79 Stat. 921. Many more aliens 
·than can be accommodated under the quota want to live 
and work in the United States. Consequently, large 
'numbers of aliens seek illegally to enter or to remain in 
·the United States. We noted last Term that "[e]sti-
mates of the number of illegal immigrants [already] in 
r 6 We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in No. 74-1560, 423 U.S. 822, and later granted Sifuentes' 
"petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in 
tandem. 423 U. S. 945. Subsequently we granted the motion of 
the Solicitor General to consolidate the cases for oral argument. 
425 U.S.-, 
' . 
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the United States vary widely. A conservative estima,te 
in 1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests 
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally 
in the country." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U. S. 873, 878 (1975) (footnote omitted). It is esti-
mated that 85% of the illegal immigrants are from 
Mexico, drawn by the fact that economic opportunities 
are significantly greater in the United States than they 
are in Mexico. United States v. Baca, supra, at 402. 
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico 
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin-
, cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at 
405. The United States shares a border with Mex-
ico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the 
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated 
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains per-
sonnel, ·electronic equipment, and fences along portions 
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals 
to enter the United Sta,tes without detection. It also is 
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of 
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully 
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain 
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country, 
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employ-
ment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by 
'prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers 
who transport them in private vehicles.. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879. 
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland 
traffic-checking operations in an effort to minimize 
7 The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued 
to simplify passage between interrelated American and Mexican 
communities along the border. These passes authorize travel within 
25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.6 
(1976). 
. ,, 
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Hlegal immigration. Permanent checkpoints, such as 
'those at San Clemente and Sarita, are maintained at 
or near intersections of important roads leading away 
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis 
·designed to avoid circumvention by smugglers and 
others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary 
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occa-
sionally are established in other strategic locations. 
'Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the 
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 ( 1973) .8 In fiscal 1973, 175,-
511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the 
'Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border 
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior ap-
prehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens.9 
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at check-
points, though precise figures are not available. United 
:States v. Baca, supra, at 405, 407 and n. 2. 
B 
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, 
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anum-
ber of fa.ctors. The Border Patrol believes that to as-
8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory author-
izations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those be-
lieved to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and 
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1357 (a) ( 1), (a) (3). 
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3) 
may be exercised anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR 
§ 287.1 (a) (1976). 
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a 
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration 
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official 
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal. 
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution. 
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-
glers, many of whom are lawfully in the United States. 
,< 
., . 
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant 
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic 
in populated areas near the border, ( ii) close to the 
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away 
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts 
vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a 
stretch of highway compatible with safe operation, and 
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes," 
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 406. 
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete 
picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente check-
point. Approximately 10million cars pass the checkpoint 
location each year, although the checkpoint actually is in 
operation only about 70ro of the time.10 In calendar 
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were 
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974 
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed thr-ough the checkpoint 
during 124Ys hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles 
were referred to the secondaFy inspection area, where 
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered 
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar 
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have 
resulted in an a.nnual total of over 33,000, although the 
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass 
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in 
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical 
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it 
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there, 
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as 
every motorist is questioned. 
10 The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of 
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages, 
weather conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads. 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and 
s~zure power·~ .in ;order to prevent arbitrary and oppres-
~ve interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal -secu~ipy of::in?.iyidpals. See United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz, 
422 U. S., at 895·; Camara v. kfunicipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 528 ( 1 967). In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguaJ:ldS applicabl~ ,.in ,particular contexts, the 
Court has weighed ·the publi~ interest against the Fourth 
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
2_0-21 ( 1968), a process evident in our previous cases 
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations. 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the ques-
tion was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally 
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it 
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized 
that important law enforcement interests were at stake 
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so sig-
nificantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that 
a search could be conducted without consent only if there 
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal 
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant au-
thorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given 
area. Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283- 285 (PowELL, 
J. , concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same 
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a 
permanent checkpoint. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, 
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve 
a different balance of public and private interests and 
appropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional 
safeguards. The question was under what circumstances 
f 
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area 
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence 
status. We found that the interference with Fourth 
Amendment interests invol¥ed in such a stop was "mod-
est," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law 
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving-
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and 
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of 
specific articulable facts, together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, that reasonably warrant sus-
picion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at 
884.11 
IV 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within 
the meaning •of "the Fourth Amendment. The defend-
ants contend primarily that the routine stopping of ve-
hicles at a checkpoint is invalia because Brignoni-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends 
in No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are per-
missible only when the practice has the advance judicial 
authorization of a warrant. 'There was a warrant au-
thorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita. 
As we reach the issue cif a warrant requirement only if 
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to 
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid 
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests 
at stake. 
A 
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance 
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary 
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled 
n On the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was im-
permissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking. 
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effectively at the border. We note here only the sub ... 
stantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine 
stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a practice 
which the Government identifies as the most important 
of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the United 
States in No. 74-1560 19-20.12 These checkpoints are lo-
cated on important highways; in their absence such high-
~ays would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into 
the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend 
many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the 
fure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries 
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily 
travelled, slowing their movement and making them 
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. 
f!fnited States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885. 
A requirement that stops on major routes inland 
a:lways be based on reasonable suspicion would be 
iinpractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too 
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car 
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier 
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement 
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct 
12 The defendants argue at length that the public interest in 
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Govern-
ment because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by 
means other than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they 
suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal 
aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative argu-
ments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually 
all search and seizure powers. In any event, these arguments 
tend to go to the general proposition that all traffic-checking pro-
cedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject. The 
defendants do not suggest persuasively that the particular law en-
forcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without reliance 
on routine checkpoint stops. Compare United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S., at 883 (effectiveness of roving patrols noi defeated 
by reasonable suspicion requirement), with infra, at 13-14. 
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of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though 
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly. 
B 
While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is 
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment 
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a 
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage with-
out interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 
154 (1925), and arguably on their right to personal secu-
rity. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers 
during which 
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is 
·a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a right to 
be in the ·united States.'" United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, supra, at 880. 
Neither the ·vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
'be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the 
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-
also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view check-
point stops in a different light because the subjective 
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on 
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the 
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that 
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than those attend-
ing a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often 
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their 
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic check-
points the motorist can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' 
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened 
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at 
894-895. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
ment analysis in this context also must take into account 
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. 
422> U. S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random 
roving· patrol stops could not be tolerated because they 
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to 
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the 
llighways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
eers. , . . [They] could stop motorists at random for 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
0f the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy high-
way, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also 
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion 
would be abused by some officers in the fie,ld. Ibid. 
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly 
on the motoring public.. First, the potential interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists 
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the 
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, 
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity. The 
regularized manner in which established checkpoints 
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-
abiding motorists, that the stops are duly au-
thorized and believed to serve the public inter-
est. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen 
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for 
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca-
tion of limited enforcement resources. We may assume 
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as 
a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars 
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passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or 
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case 
of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a par-
ticular exercise of discretion in locating or opera.ting a 
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judi-
cif:l,l review.13 
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente check-
point suggest that its operation involves a significant 
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small per-
centage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection 
area, thereby "stigmatizing" those diverted and reducing 
the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motor-
ists. We think defendants overstate the consequences. 
Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting 
a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that 
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the 
'traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop 
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral 
may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that 
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because 
of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover, 
selective referrals--rather than questioning the occupants 
of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment 
interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general 
motoring public. 
c 
The defendants note correctly that to accommodate 
public and private interests some quantum of in-
dividualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a 
13 The choice of checkpoint locations must be left largely to the 
discretion of Border Patrol officials, to be exercised in accordance 
with statutes and regulations that may be applicable. See n. 15, 
infra. Many incidents of checkpoint operation also must be com-
mitted to the discretion of such officials. But see infra, at 22-23. 
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constitutional search or seizure.14 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U. S., at 154.. In Camara the Court required an 
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspect~ 
ing private residences within a particular area for build-
ing code violations, but recognized that "specific knowl-
edge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was 
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at 
538. In so holding, the Court examined the govern-
ment interests advanced to justify such routine intru-
sions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of 
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that 
under the circumstances the government interests out-
weighed those of the private citizen. 
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here, 
where we deal neither with searches nor with the 
14 Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, 
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding 
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar 
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be 
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusive-
ness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' posi-
tion, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials 
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated.. As 
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them 
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles 
briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility 
and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use. 
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sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded 
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. 
See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its 
operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence, 
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 ( 1974) (plurality. 
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures fol-. 
lowed in making these checkpoint stops makes the re-
sulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate 
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforce-
ment technique is demonstrated by the records in the 
.cases before us. Accordingly, we-hold that the stops and 
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of 
. any individualized suspicion at reasonably located 
checkpoin ts.15 
15 As a judicial warrant autbori:aed the Border Patrol to make rou-
• tine stops at · the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question 
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 74-
1560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when 
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 5, S'f6pra. The Court of Appeals held 
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant 
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. /d., at 
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens 
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of 
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with 
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings spe-
cifically, as we conclude tha.t no warrant is needed. But we deem 
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the 
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant 
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San 
Clemente. 
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above, 
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
-motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
1the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the 
'basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/6 we perceive no 
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision 
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol, 
see supra, at 15; cf. Camara v . . Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Cle-
mente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed 
by the Border Patrol to ass{lre effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and 
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement 
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of appre-
see supra, at 16 ; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 
hensions of the checkpoint is high, see supra, at 10, confirming 
Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens 
use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was selected as 
the location where San Diego-to-Los Angeles traffic is lightest, 
thereby minimizing interference with legitimate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
1.s The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents 
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when 
. selectively stopping motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75-
5387, 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884-885. 
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the 
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning, 
·whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legaUy resident 
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the 
}>opulation of Southern California, The 1970 census figures, which 
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California 
selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75-
to be approximately 19,958,000 of whom some 3,102,000, of 16%, 
are Spanish speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent per-
centages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and 
18% respectively. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1970 Census of Popu-
lation, val. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the statewide population ratio 
is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through 
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in 
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constitutional violatil)n, Cf. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi-
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist 
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol 
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor-
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.11 
v 
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops 
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has 
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint 
location and the practice of routine stops. A warrant 
requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent, 
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code 
inspection, even though the search could be conducted 
absent cause to believe that there were violations in 
the building searched.18 
No. 74-1560, roughly 23,400 would be expected to contain persons 
of Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 were referred to the 
secondary area. This appears to refute any suggestion that the 
Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry 
standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary area. 
17 Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area dur-
. ing the eight days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. Thus, to the extent 
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this 
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law 
enforcement need to be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given 
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make 
Mexican appearance a relevant factor ... ," although we held that 
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable 
suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop. !d., at 885-887. Different 
considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on appar-
ent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian 
border, 
18 There also is some support for a wa.rrant requirement in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
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We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt 
model. It involved the search of private residences, for 
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See, 
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment inter-
ests that justify the warrant requirement in that con-
text are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon 
·privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house 
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with 
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as 
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in 
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to 
which a warrant requirement here would make little con-
tribution. The Court there said: 
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] de-
mands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code in-
volved requires inspection of his premises, no way 
·of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion." 387 U. S., at 532. 
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these 
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of 
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances in this case. 
Other purposes served by the requirement of 
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such pur-
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five 
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however, 
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the in-
dividualized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary 
to sustain roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion is 
not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-
Sanchez is not an issue in these cases. 
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pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United 
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 45·5-456 n. 22 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The reasonableness of 
checkpoint stops, however, turns on factors such as the 
location and method of operation of the checkpoint, fac-
tors that are not susceptible of the distortion of hindsight, 
and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwith-
standing the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for 
a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of 
the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer. 
Unied States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297, 316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced 
when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands 
of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to 
the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials. 
VI 
In summary, we .hold that stops for brief questioning 
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
thorized by warrant.19 'the principal protection of Fourth 
1~ MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted 
concern in suggesting that today's decision marks a radical new 
intrusion on citizens'j rights: It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth 
Amendment protections," and states that the Court "virtually 
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post, 
at 1, 2. Since 1952, Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 233, Congress 
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interro-
gated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance" 
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The 
;:lan Clemente checkpoint has been operating a.t or near its present 
location throughout the intervening 24 years. Our prior cases have 
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization, 
tequiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and 
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra, 
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief 
74-1560 & 75-5387:-:0PI:r-j"ION 
UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 23 
,Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim-
itations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S., at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint 
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or 
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. 
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops 
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ... 
must be based on consent or probable eause." United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the de-
fendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers 
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the 
;judgment ofl'the ·Corti't of Appe~ls for the Fifth Circuit, 
which had affil'med the conviction of Sifuentes. We re-
verse the ·judgmeht of the Coutt of Appeals for the Ninth 
'Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the 
conviction of :Ma:rtinez-Fuerte and to remand the other 
··lc'ases to the District Court for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
questioning (a type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to 
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither 
longstanding congressional autliorization nor widely prevailing prac-
tice justifies a constitutional violation. We do suggest, however, 
that against this background and in the context of our recent 
decisions, the rhetoric of the dissent reflects unjustified concern. 
The dissenting opinion further warns: 
"Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican 
alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that 
he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his] risk ... ," Post, 
at 6. 
For the reason stated in n. 16, supra, this concern is misplaced. 
Moreover, upon a proper showing, courts would not be powerless 
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the 
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/6 we perceive no 
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above, 
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision 
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol, 
see supra, at 16; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Cle-
mente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed 
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and 
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement 
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of appre-
hensions at the checkpoint is high, see supra, at 10, confirming 
Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens 
regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was 
selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los Angeles traffic is 
lightest, thereby minimizing interference with ·legitimate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents 
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when 
selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75-
5387, 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 884-885. 
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the 
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning, 
whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legally resident 
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the 
population of Southern California, The 1970 census figures, which 
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California 
to be approximately 19,958,000 of whom some 3,102,000, or 16%, 
are Spanish speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent per-
centages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and 
18% respectively. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1970 Census of Popu-
lation, vol. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the statewide population ratio 
is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through 
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in 
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pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluatiOn 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure, Cf. United 
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 455-456 n. 22 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The reasonableness of 
checkpoint stops, however, turns on factors such as the 
location and method of operation of the checkpoint, fa.c-
tors that are not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, 
and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwith-
standing the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for 
a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of 
the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer. 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297, 316--318 ( 1972). But the need· for·· this is reduced 
when the decision to "seize" · is not entirely in the hands 
·. of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to 
the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials. 
VI 
In summary, we hold that stops. for · btief questioning 
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
t~orized by warrant.19 ~he principal protec~io~ of Fourth 
11l .).\1R •. JusTICE .BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted 
concern . iri suggesting .. that to<iay's decision marks a radical new 
intrusion on citizens' 'fights: It sp~aks of the "evisceration of Fourth 
Amendment protections," .. and · states t~at the Court "virtually 
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post, 
at 1, 2. Since 1952, Act of June '21, 1952; 66 Stat. 233, Congress 
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interro-
gated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance" 
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The 
San Clemente checkpoint has been operating at or near its present 
location throughout the intervening 24 years. Our prior cases have 
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization, 
requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and 
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra, 
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief 
NOTE: Where It Is teasfble, a syllabus (headuote) will be re-
leased, as Is being done In connection with this case, at tbe time 
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no !>art of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter or Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United Statea v. Detroit Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
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1. The Border Patrol's routine stopping of a vehicle at a 
permanent checkpoint located on a major highway away from 
the Mexican border for brief questioning of the vehicle's occu-
pants is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and the stops 
and questioning may be made at reasonably located checkpoints 
in the absence of any individualized suspicion that the particular 
vehicle contains illegal aliens. Pp. 12-20. 
(a) To require that such stops always be based on reason-
able suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic 
tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a 
given car necessary to identify it as a possible carrier of illegal 
aliens. Such a requirement also would largely eliminate any 
deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, 
even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly. 
Pp. 12-14. 
(b) While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is 
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests 
is quite limited, the interference with legitimate traffic being 
minimal and checkpoint operations involving less discretionary 
enforcement activity than roving-patrol stops. Pp. 14-16. 
(c) Under the circumstances of these checkpoint stops, which 
do not involve searches, the Government or public interest in 
making such stops outweighs the constitutionally protected inter-
est of the private citizen. Pp. 16-18. 
(d) With respect to the checkpoint involved in No. 74--1560, 
it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to a secondary 
*Together with No. 75-5387, Sifuentes v. United States, on cer-
tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
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inspection area for limited inquiry on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop, since the intrusion is 
sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to 
justify it. Pp. 19-20. 
2. Operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in 
advance by a judicial warrant. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S. 523, distinguished. The visible manifestations of the field 
officers' authority at a checkpoint provide assurances to motorists 
that the officers are acting lawfully. Moreover, the purpose of 
a warrant in preventing hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure is inapplicable here, 
since the reasonableness of checkpoint stops turns on factors such 
as the checkpoint's location and method of operation. These 
factors are not susceptible of the distortion of hindsight, and will 
be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a 
warrant. Nor is the purpose of a warrant in substituting a 
magistrate's judgment for that of the searching or seizing officer 
applicable, since the need for this is reduced when the decision 
to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the field officer and 
deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of higher 
ranking officials in selecting the checkpoint locations. Pp. 20-22. 
No. 74-1560, 514 F. 2d 308, reversed and remanded; No. 75-5387, 
affirmed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER, 
C. J., and S'l'EWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, 
JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J ., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MAR· 
SHALL, J., joined. 
. ,
~e~ICE : This opinion ·Is subject to formal revision before publlcatlou 
In tbe preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are 're• 
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE~ 
Nos. 74-1560 AND 75-5387 
United States, Petitioner, l 0~ Writ. of Certiorari to 
74-1560 v. · the Umted States Court 
. of Appeals for the 
Amado Martmez-Fuerte et al. Ninth Circuit. 
Rodolfo Sifuentes Petitioner l On Writ of Certiorari to 
75-5387 ' ' the United States Court 
. dv.S . of Appeals for the Fifth 
Umte tates. Circuit. · 
'[July 6, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses 
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. 
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint 
operated by the Border Patrol away from the interna-
tional border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusiol) 
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of 
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth 
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth 
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether 
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief 
questioning of its occupants even though there is no 
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal 
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold 
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a 
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by 
a judicial warrant . 
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I 
A 
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in 
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made 
on three different occasions at the permanent immigra-
tion checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. 
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego 
&nd Los Angeles, and · the San Clemente checkpoint is 
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We pre-
viously have described the checkpoint as follows: 
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint 
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow 
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, 
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a 
mile further north are two black on yellow signs 
suspended over the highway with flashing lights 
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the 
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of 
California weighing station, are two large signs with 
flashing red lights suspended over the highway. 
These signs each state "STOP HERE-D. S. OF-
FICERS." Placed on the highway are a number 
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes 
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, 
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks 
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are offi-
cial U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red 
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building 
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary 
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for 
nighttime operation.'" United States v. Ortiz, 
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. 
Supp. 398, 410- 411 (SD Cal. 1973). 
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of 
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the 
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt.1 
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with-
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a 
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will 
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs 
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their oc-
cupants are asked about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status. The Government informs us that at San 
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the 
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief 
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the second-
ary inspection area could be based on something suspi-
cious about a particular car passing through the check-
point, but the Government concedes that none of the 
three stops at issue in No. 74--1560 was based on any 
articulable suspicion. During the period when these 
stops were made, the checkpoint was opera.ting under 
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which au-
thorized the Border Patrol to conduct a routine-stop 
operation at the San Clemente location.2 
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved 
1 The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the 
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely 
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute 
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motor-
ists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been 
"seized." 
2 The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was 
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rou~ 
tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without 
'such a warrant. See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974), 
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v. 
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F. 2d 7 (1974). Soon after the warrant issued, 
the Court of Appeals abo held unconstitutional routine checkpoint 
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer .. 
Rivera, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974) . See also n. 151 infra. 
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the 
case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fucrte approached 
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two fe-
male passengers. The women were illegal Mexican 
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro 
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused 
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported 
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to 
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro-
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident 
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the 
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts 
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. 
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evi-
dence stemming from the stop on the ground that the 
operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.3 The motion to suppress was de-
nied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury 
trial. 
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass 
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing 
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by pre-
arrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been 
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the second-
ary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the 
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged in two counts 
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) 
(2) , and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C. 
8 Each of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in 
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony 
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brig-
noni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]here may be 
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial, 
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized 
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . ." The-
question again is not before us. 
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived 
from the stop was granted. 
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Me-
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen 
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passen-
gers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area re-
vealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal 
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three 
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had 
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near 
Tijuana, Mexico, where they re11dezvoused with Guillen, 
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan 
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans-
porting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of 
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4), 
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress. 
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the 
Government appealed the granting of the motions to 
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia 
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan.4 The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three 
appeals, which presented the common question whether 
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court of Ap-
peals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops 
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop 
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol 
4 The prosecution of Martmez-Fuerte was before a different dis-
trict judge than were the other cases. 
5 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the 
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under 
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were 
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved 
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be mad~ 
absent a warrant , 
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the' 
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's· 
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the· 
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand. 
B 
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar-
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S. 
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates 
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways 
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The 
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Browns-
ville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the 
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the 
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente, 
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that 
the officers customarily stop all northbound motor-
ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers 
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved 
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the 
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was con-
ducted without a judicial warrant,. 
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any 
visible passengers. When an agent approached the ve--
hicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the 
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down 
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger 
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United 
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the 
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across 
the Rio Grande. 
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally 
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). He 
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the-
.evidence derived from the stop. The motion was de .... 
'74-1560 & 15-5381-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 1 
nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes 
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal, 
contending primarily that stops made without rea-
son to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are 
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an un-
published order, relying on its opinion in United States 
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court 
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.6 
II 
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law 
enforcement technique considered important by those 
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn-
ing to the constitutional question, we examine the con-
text in which it arises. 
A 
It has been national policy for many years to limit 
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968, 
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, 
has been 120,000 persons. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-236, §21 (e), 79 Stat. 921. Many more aliens 
than can be accommodated under the quota want to live 
and work in the United States. Consequently, large 
numbers of aliens seek illegally to enter or to remain in 
the United States. We noted last Term that "[e]sti-
mates of the number of illeg~l immigrants [already] in 
0 We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in No. 74-1.160, 423 U. S. 822, and later granted Sifuentes' 
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in 
tandem. 423 U. S. 945. Subsequently we granted the motion of 
the Solicitor General to consQ]idate the cases for oral argument. 
425 u.s.-. 
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the United States vary widely. A conservative estimaw 
in 1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests 
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally 
in the country." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U. S. 873, 878 (1975) (footnote omitted). It is esti-
mated that 85% of the illegal immigrants are from 
Mexico, drawn by the fact that economic opportunities 
are significantly greater in the United States than they 
are in Mexico. United States v. Baca, supra, at 402. 
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico 
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin-
cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. Id., at 
405. The United States shares a border with Mex-
ico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the 
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated 
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains per-
sonnel, ·electronic equipment, and fences along portions 
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals 
to enter the United States without detection. It also is 
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of 
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully 
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain 
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country, 
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employ-
ment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by 
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers 
who transport them in private vehicles. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879. 
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland 
traffic-checking operations in an effort to minimize 
1 The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued 
to simplify passage bctwren interrelated American and Mexican 
communities along the border. These passes authorize tra.vel within 
25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.() 
( 1976). 
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illegal immigration. Permanent checkpoints, such as 
those at San Clemente and Sarita, are ma.intained at 
or near intersections of important roads leading away 
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis 
designed to avoid circumvention by smugglers and 
others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary 
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occa-
sionally are established in other strategic locations. 
Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the 
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973).8 In fiscal 1973, 175,-
511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the 
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border 
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior ap-
prehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens.9 
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at check-
points, though precise figures are not available. United 
States v. Baca, supra, at 405, 407 and n. 2. 
B 
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, 
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a num-
ber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to as-
8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory author-
izations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those be-
lieved to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and 
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U S. C. §§ 1357 (a) (1) , (a) (3). 
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3) 
may be exercised anywhere w1thin 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR 
§ 287.1 (a) (1976) . 
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a 
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration 
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official 
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal. 
1973) . Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution. 
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-· 
·@jet:S, many o.f whQm are lawfully m the United States. 
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant 
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic 
in populated areas near the border, ( ii) close to the 
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away 
ftom the border, (iii)1 situated' in terrain that restricts 
vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a 
stretch of highway compatible with safe operation, and 
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes," 
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra, 
at 406. 
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete 
picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente check-
point. Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint 
location each year, although the checkpoint actually is in 
operation only about 70o/o of the time.10 In calendar 
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were 
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974 
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, 
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint 
during 124Ys hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles 
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where 
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered 
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar 
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have 
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the 
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass 
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in 
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical 
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it 
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there, 
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as 
every motorist is questioned. 
10 The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of 
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages, 
weather conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads. 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and 
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppres-
sive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals. See United State$ 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz, 
422 U. S., at 895-; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 528 ( 1967). In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the 
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth 
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases 
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations. 
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the ques-
tion was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally 
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it 
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized 
that important law enforcement interests were at stake 
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so sig-:-
nificantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that 
a search could be conducted without consent only if there· 
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal 
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warmnt au-
thorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given 
area. Compa.re id., at 273, with id., at 283~285 (PowELL, 
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same 
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a 
permanent checkpoint. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, 
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve 
a different balance of public and private interests and 
appropriately a.re subject to less stringent constitutional 
&afeguarqs. The questio.n was under what circumstance~ 
.. 
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area. 
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence 
status. We found that the interference with Fourth 
Amendment interests involv·ed in such a stop was "mod-
est," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law 
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving· 
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and 
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of 
specific articulable facts, together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, that reasonably warrant sus-
picion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. ld., at 
884.11 
IV 
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 11seizures" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defend .. 
ants contend primarily that the routine stopping of ve-
hicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce 
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends 
ih No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are per-
missible only when the practice has the advance judicial 
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant au-
thorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita. 
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if 
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to 
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid 
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests 
at stake. 
A 
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance 
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary 
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled 
11 On the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was i.m .. 
permissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking. 
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effectively at the border. We note here only the sub· 
stantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine 
stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a practice 
which the Government identifies as the most important 
of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the United 
States in No. 74-1560 19-20.12 These checkpoints are lo-
cated on important highways; in their absence such high-
ways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into 
the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend 
many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the 
lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries 
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily 
travelled, slowing their movement and making them 
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885-. 
A requirement that stops on major routes inland 
always be based on reasonable suspicion would be 
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too 
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car 
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier 
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement 
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct 
12 The defendants argue at length that the public interest in 
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Govern-
ment because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by 
means other than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they 
suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal 
aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative argu-
ments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually 
all search and seizure powers. In any event, these arguments 
tend to go to the general proposition that all traffic-checking pro-
cedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject. The 
defendants' do not suggest persuasively that the particular law en-
forcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without reliance· 
on routine checkpoint stops. Compare United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S., at 883 (effectiveness of roving patrols not defeated 
by reasonable suspicion requirement), with infra, at 13-14. 
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of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though 
smugglers are known to . use these highways regularly. 
B 
While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is 
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment 
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a 
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage with-
out interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 
154 ( 1925), and arguably on their right to personal secu-
rity. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers 
during which 
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is 
a response to a brief question or two and possibly 
the production of a document evidencing a right to 
be in the United States.'" United States v. Brig-
. noni-Ponce, supra, at 880. 
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and 
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can 
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the 
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-
also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view check-
point stops in a different light because the subjective 
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on 
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the 
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that 
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than those attend-
ing a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often 
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their 
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic check-
points the motorist can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' 
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened 
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or annoyed by the intrusion.'1 422 U. S., at 
894-895. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
ment analysis in this context also must take into account 
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. 
422 U.S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random 
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they 
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to 
potentially unlimited interference with their use ,of the 
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers. • . . [They] could stop motorists at random for 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy high-
way, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also 
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion 
would be abused by some officers in the field. Ibid. 
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly 
on the motoring public. First, the potential interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists 
using these high ways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the 
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, 
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity. The, 
regularized manner in which established checkpoints 
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-
abiding motorists, that the stops are duly au-
thorized and believed to serve the public inter-
est. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen 
by officers in the field, but by officials responsiple for 
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca-
tion of limited enforcement resources. We may assume 
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as 
a cl~. And since field officers may stop only those cars 
. 
' 
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passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or 
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case 
of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a par-
ticular exercise of discretion in locating or opera.ting a 
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judi~ 
cial review.13 
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente check-
point suggest that its operation involves a significant 
extra element of intrusfveness in that only a small per-
centage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection 
area, thereby "stigmatizing" those diverted and reducing 
the assurances provided by equal treatment of aU motor-
ists. We think defendants overstate the consequences. 
Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting 
a routine and limited. inquiry into residence status that 
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the 
traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop 
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral 
may involve some annoyance, but it r·emains true that 
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because 
of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover, 
selective referrals-rather than questioning the occupants 
of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment 
interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general 
motoring public. 
c 
The defendants note correctly that to accommodate 
public and private interests some quantum of in-
dividualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a 
13 The choice of checkpoint locations must be left la.rgely to the 
discretion of Border Patrol officials, to be exercised in accordance 
with statutes and regulations that may be applicable. Se~ n. 15, 
infra. Many incidents of checkpoint operation also must be com• 
mitted to the discretion of such officials. But see infra, at 22-23. 
•. "" 
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constitutional search or seizure.14 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288 
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U. S., at 154. In Camara the Court required an 
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspect-
ing private residences within a particular area for build-
ing code violations, but recognized that "specific knowl-
edge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was 
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at 
538. In so holding, the Court examined the govern-
ment interests advanced to justify such routine intru- · 
sions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of 
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that 
under the circumstances the government interests out-
weighed those of the private citizen. 
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here, 
where we deal neither with searches nor with the 
14 Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, 
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding· 
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar· 
matters. The bet that the purpose of such laws is &'tid to be 
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusive-
ness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' posi-
tion, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials 
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the· 
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As 
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them 
other tf1an to note that this practice of stopping automobiles 
briefly· for questioning· has a long history evidencing its utility-
and. is accepted. by mPtoJrist.s as incident to highway use. 
'. 
. I. 
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sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded 
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. 
See, e. (]., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its 
operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence. 
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality 
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures fol-
lowed in making these checkpoint stops makes the re-
sulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate 
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforce-
ment technique is demonstrated by the records in the 
cases before us. Accordingly, we hold that the stops and 
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of 
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located 
checkpoints.15 
1 ~ As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make rou-
tine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question 
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 74-
1560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when 
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 5, supra. The Court of Appeals held 
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant 
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Id., at 
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens 
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of 
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with 
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings spe-
cifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem 
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the 
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant 
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San, 
Clemente . 
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer 
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at 
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that 
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if 
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the 
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/6 we perceive no 
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above, 
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision 
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol, 
see supra, at 16; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Cle-
mente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed 
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and 
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement 
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of appre-
hensions at the checkpoint is high, see supra, at 10, confirming 
Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens 
regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was 
selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los Angeles traffic is 
lightest, thereby minimizing interference with legitimate traffic. 
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the 
location of the Sarita checkpoint. 
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents 
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when 
selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75-
5387, 9; see United 'States v. Brignoni-Ppnce, 422 U.S., at 884-885. 
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the 
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning, 
whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legaHy resident 
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the 
population of Southern California. The 1970 census figures, which 
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California 
to be approximately 19,958,000 of whom some 3,102,000, or 16%1 
are Spanish speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent per-
centages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and 
18% respectively. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1970 Census of Popu-
lation, val. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the statewide population ratio 
Is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through 
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in 
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constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi-
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist 
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol 
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor-
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.17 
v 
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops 
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has 
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint 
location and the practice of routine stops. A warrant 
requirement in these circumstances draws some support 
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent, 
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code 
inspection, even though the search could be conducted 
absent cause to believe that there were violations in 
the building searched.18 
No. 74-1560, roughly 23,400 would be expected to contain persons 
of Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 were referred to the 
secondary area. This appears to refute any suggestion that the 
Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry 
standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary area. 
17 Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area dur-
ing the eight days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 7 4-1560, 
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. Thus, to the extent 
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this 
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law 
enforcement need to be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given 
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make 
Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . ," although we held that 
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable 
suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop. !d., at 885~887. Different 
considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on appar-
ent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian 
border, 
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 21 
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt 
model. It involved the search of private residences, for 
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See, 
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed 
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment inter-
ests that justify the warrant requirement in that con-
text are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon 
privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house 
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with 
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as 
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in 
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to 
which a warrant requirement here would make little con-
tribution. The Court there said : 
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] de-
mands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code in-
volved requires inspection of his premises, no way 
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether 'the in-
spector himself is acting under proper authoriza-
tion." 387 U. S., at 532. 
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these 
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of 
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide sub-
stantially the same assurances in this case. 
Other purposes served by the requirement of 
a warrant also ar·e inapplicable here. One such pur-
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five 
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring) ; id ., at 288 
(WHITE, J ., dissenting) . The burden of these opinions, however, 
was that an "area" warrant could serve as a substitute for the in-
dividualized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary 
to sustain roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion is 
not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-
Sanchez is not an issue in these cases. 
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pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United 
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 455-456 n. 22 (1976) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The reasonableness of 
checkpoint stops, however, turns on factors such as the 
location and method of operation of the checkpoint, fac .. 
tors that are not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, 
and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwith-
standing the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for 
a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of 
the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer. 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297, 316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced 
when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands 
of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to 
the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials. 
VI 
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning 
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be au-
thorized by warrant.19 The principal protection of Fourth 
19 MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted 
concern in suggesting that today's decision marks a radical new 
intrusion on citizens' rights: It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth 
Amendment protections," and states that the Court "virtually 
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post, 
at 1, 2. Since 1952, Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 233, Congress 
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interro-
gated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance"· . 
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The 
San Clemente checkpoint has been operating at or near its present 
location throughout the intervening 24 years . Our prior cases have 
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization, 
requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and 
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra, 
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief 
'i'4-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE 23 
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim-
itations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U. S., at 24--27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
s:upra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint 
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or 
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. 
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops 
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ... 
must be based on consent or probable cause." United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the de-
fendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers 
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the 
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other 
~ases to the District Court for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
·questioning (a type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to 
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither 
longstanding congressional authorization nor widely prevailing prac-
tice justifies a constitutional violation. We do suggest, however, 
that against this background and in the context of our recent 
decisions, the rhetoric of the dissent reflects unjustified concern. 
The dissenting opinion further warns: 
"Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican 
alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that 
he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his] risk ... ," Post, 
at 6. 
For the reason stated in n. 16, supra, this concern is misplaced. 
Moreover, upon a proper showing, courts would not be powerless 
to prevent the misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican 
:ancestry. 
